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MILITARY ROLES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  
AN INVENTORY OF PAST RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

by

Peter G. Riddleberger

463188

SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON 16, D.C.

OPERATING UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Research Memorandum 15-2

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Task ROLE  
Research Completed: December 1964

MILITARY ROLES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  
AN INVENTORY OF PAST RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

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TASK ROLE

Research Memorandum 65-2

SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE  
The American University  
Washington, D. C., 20016

March 1965

## FOREWORD

U. S. military forces are becoming increasingly involved in assisting and working with counterparts in developing nations. With this growing involvement is a growing need to be aware of military roles and functions appropriate for various stages of national development. This study is an early effort in increasing understanding of the roles of military establishments in the developing nations, and is designed primarily as a foundation of current knowledge upon which future research may be based. It is hoped that this background information may be of educational and reference value for military practitioners.

Theodore R. Vallance  
Director

## PREFACE

This inventory of past research and analysis is designed to give the academic and military reader an overall picture of the state of contemporary knowledge about the roles played by military establishments in developing nations. It reflects the large and increasing number of studies available on the subject and, in this sense, constitutes a review of the current "state of the art."

While opinions about the positive, constructive value of military roles in sociopolitical processes vary widely, there is a general consensus on the significance of this area of study. Whether military establishments are considered to be inimical to orderly and democratic processes of change, or whether the military is felt to be the institution best suited for guiding new states through the transition from traditionalism to modernity, no one denies that military roles are of crucial concern.

The report is organized into three major sections. Part I consists of a general discussion of the state of knowledge about military roles: types of research performed, relationship of research to changing United States objectives and policy, needs for further study, and a summary of general knowledge about military establishments for four major regions of the world. Part II consists of an inventory of findings and conclusions about military roles in the developmental process in the form of general statements selected from the literature and categorized by types of social, economic, political, and military functions. Part III is a detailed annotated bibliography of the references used in compiling this report.

The report should provide military and academic students with a comprehensive, though not necessarily all-inclusive, perspective of our present state of knowledge, needs for further study, and, most important, the various approaches and frames of reference employed by experts who have already addressed this problem.

This project began in the spring of 1963 under the direction of Dr. William Lybrand and was completed with the aid and guidance of Dr. Ritchie Lowry, Acting Chairman of the Basic Studies Division. Since the report is designed primarily as an educational and research aid, the author would greatly appreciate receiving comments and suggestions from the readers.

Peter Riddleberger

January 1965



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PART I

STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ROLES OF THE MILITARY  
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

## INTRODUCTION

The following is an analysis of the research material set forth in Parts II and III. The current state of knowledge on the role of the military is examined by regions and countries of the world. Attention is given to the contributions that such research can make to the formation of U. S. policy.

### EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

In medieval Europe, military training was merely one of the several undertakings of a nobleman. Battle was entered into with emotional enthusiasm but physical restraint, the goal being the expression of aristocratic personality. In the course of the Hundred Years' War between England and France, bodies of professional fighting men, mercenaries who sold their services to the highest bidder, were common. Both leaders and men were of diverse nationalities, and changes of allegiance were frequent and respectable. During the 17th century, after the Thirty Years' War, certain modern features of the military began to appear in Europe. The most important of these were: (1) development of a permanent leadership elite and the possibility of making a full-time career of military life and (2) professional standards for the military, with a concomitant bureaucratic form of administration.

The military establishment is today basically a product and consequence of the nation-state. In the political system of the nation-state, nationalism became the major factor in domestic and foreign politics, demanding the full attention of national leaders. The military as an institution henceforth directed its major attention toward operational problems of national security. During that time, the military establishment developed new and unique characteristics, which reflected the social and political characteristics of the culture in which it existed, its contributions to the maintenance of the system that created it and the forces that contributed to its own maintenance and development.

Perceptive observers early recognized these phenomena. Some even noticed significant differences among military establishments in various political systems. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, noted the differences between the officer corps of the French monarchy and that of the newly-emerging United States in the early 19th century.<sup>1</sup> In the middle of the 19th century, the British statesman Benjamin Disraeli observed that the army often reflected certain social problems of the larger cultural context. He commented on the meeting of the army in India in 1857: "I am persuaded that the conduct of the Bengal Army in revolting against our authority was the conduct of men who were not so much the avengers of professional grievances as the exponents of general discontent."<sup>2</sup> It is thus clear that for over a hundred years the military has been recognized as part of a broader social and political whole.

In addition to the responsibility for national security, the modern military has taken over other functions, including counterinsurgency and control of riots and political subversion. It is within this context that much of the research on the role of the military is being done today.

#### TYPES OF RESEARCH

Developing nations offer social scientists contemporary examples of states in the process of transition. Although in each case certain aspects of national development are unique, some follow the European patterns.

Social scientists by and large agree that it is difficult to identify particular institutions and personnel who play significant roles. Some, like Almond and Coleman, go further: they advocate using functional instead of institutional criteria for a

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1. De Tocqueville suggested that the fact that the French officers were addressed by their noble titles was significant when compared with the attitudes of American soldiers to military rank. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Vintage Press, 1958), pp. 280-281.

2. A. T. Embree (ed.), 1857 in India (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1963), p.5.

framework of analysis.<sup>3</sup> However, this presents difficulties in the transitional period because both institutions and personnel are in such a state of flux that neither functions nor roles can readily be identified.

Western scholars are interested in the military establishments of developing countries for two reasons: (1) They are readily identifiable institutions with a familiar organization and hierarchy. (2) Their control of the means of force puts them in a position to influence and often determines the political trends of the emerging state, whereas civilian institutions may have little or no self-sustaining capabilities. Historical evidence suggests that the armed forces have often played a crucial role in the political trends and social values of all nation-states. Gaetano Mosca and Alfred Vagts have found the role of the military in the development process of the European states in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries to be significant.<sup>4</sup>

Existing studies of the military in new nations may be classified as either theoretical analyses or case studies of military elites (including comparative analyses of characteristic military roles and functions in emerging countries). Those studies based upon theoretical analysis are of two kinds. The first draws largely upon preliminary observations derived from more explicit studies of military establishments in developed nations and from abstract propositions identifying the role of the armed forces in the nation-building process (for example, the impact of the military on the processes of bureaucratization, secularization, democratization, and nationalization). The second offers propositions and typologies which identify the significant variables that influence the internal structure of the military establishment (for example, career patterns of officers, social mobility, military

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3. Gabriel Almond and J. S. Coleman (ed.), The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

4. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939); and Alfred Vagts, The History of Militarism (New York: Meridian Books, 1959).

in which military and civilian leaders exercise decision-making power, perhaps the most essential sociological dimension in the analysis of political systems.

Comparative studies that analyze the role of the military in differing social and cultural contexts have been hindered by the type of material available to the scholar. Since most of the data is historical and descriptive, it cannot be manipulated easily within any specific analytical format. In addition, needed information may be incomplete for certain countries and regions. Little is yet known, for example, about the particular form and structure of the emerging military establishments of the new African nations. Furthermore, no single analytical framework has yet been widely accepted for meaningfully organizing and handling data on a cross-cultural basis.

#### MILITARY ROLES AND UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

In addition to their primary function of external defense, military establishments can be valuable participants in or impediments to programs of political, social, and economic development. The military is a key group in the political life of most underdeveloped countries. Even when it is not directly involved in competition for political power, its actions and programs can have a major impact on social and political developments. Positive contributions may range from civic action to teaching conscripts skills useful in an industrial society, such as reading and writing. On the other hand, military demands for expenditures on such items as sophisticated hardware may go beyond the evident defense need of the country and compete with the domestic social and economic program for scarce resources.

In many developing countries the military establishment represents the best-organized, most highly-disciplined, and most westernized (in terms of technical and engineering capabilities) administrative structure in the society. Military officers are also likely to be among the best educated, particularly in engineering, physical sciences, and administration. At the same time, it is in the nature of their



profession to have a greater sense of the nation and loyalty to it than many of their fellow citizens.

These qualities of the officer corps take on added significance when measured against the paucity of responsible and skilled civilian politicians and well-trained civil servants. The importance of the military in developing countries is thus a function not only of their own assets but also of the inadequacies in the civilian sector.

Involvement of the military in the processes of modernization also causes a certain dilemma. While the armed services are often the agents most capable of reaching certain objectives (for example, technical modernization), their participation also tends to hinder the attainment of other desirable objectives (for example, democratization). With some exceptions, it is probably still true that the military represents one of the stronger anti-Communist, although not necessarily pro-Western, forces in most emerging nations.

The nature of the officer corps in many countries is in the process of major change, and it can no longer be assumed that the officers are aligned with the traditional or conservative elements. In some countries military services have begun attracting ambitious and capable men of lower-class origins. It seems reasonable to assume that they will reflect increasingly within their own ranks more general social divisions and dissensions and that the new military leaders will tend to be politically oriented toward social reform. The military has not hesitated to actively block economic and social reform, although that is becoming less common.

Aside from their positions on communism, the indigenous military establishments have a critical role to play in the achievement of United States' objectives in a number of ways: for example, by using their often unique engineering and organizational capabilities in civic projects, which may at the same time strengthen the link between city and countryside; by giving useful skills and perhaps a greater sense of citizenship and national identity to military recruits; by making a responsible approach to defense expenditures, taking account of budgetary stringencies and trying to strike

a sensible balance with development needs. However, if the local military is motivated in its activities by objectives and priorities incompatible with those of the United States, the success of our policies is doubtful.

#### NEEDS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Research in the field of civil-military relations is beginning to concentrate on projecting future developments in specific regions of the world. Here the diagnostic value of sociology and political science comes to the fore. There are a number of working hypotheses which seem to have retained their utility and applicability. Morris Janowitz has brought some of these together in his recent book.<sup>8</sup> This report inventories others. Yet the difficulty remains that many of these findings and conclusions have their origins in diverse social environments. What is true for military establishments in Latin America may or may not be applicable to the emerging military forces in Africa. The greatest shortcomings are found in the contributions of empirical research, by which hypotheses are confirmed or disproved. Indeed, the most elementary descriptive research is often lacking in a number of cases, and case studies are all but totally absent for some parts of the world (for example, Africa).

This need acknowledged, some of the attendant dangers and difficulties must be faced. Obvious problems are presented by the shortage of competent research personnel, the deficiency of financial resources, and the small number of organizations that can coordinate research on the role of military in contemporary changing society. There is also the problem of inordinate expectations: the social scientists

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8. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). See Annotation 67.

engaged in the research or the ultimate consumer may insist on too many details, too rigid a framework, or too much haste. Even the order and priority of research projects and the limits within which they must be conducted are not yet completely clear. However, the nature of the study and the general type of product that should be expected from it are generally understood.

The role of the military has only recently become a problem area for analytical research. The essay by Majid Khadduri in 1953 and the volume by Edwin Lieuwen in 1960 set the stage for this development.<sup>9</sup> An article by Lyle McAlister in 1961 outlined the usefulness of combining historical data with modern techniques of social science research.<sup>10</sup> These studies tend to agree on the need for further research into the causes, dimensions, processes, and consequences of the changing role of the military.

As can be seen from the annotations, the field abounds with case studies of particular military forces in specific countries. There has been some attempt (by Lieuwen, for example<sup>11</sup>) to classify military establishments according to the frequency of their intervention in politics and to correlate this with the type of political system. However, most case studies are actually preliminary investigations, and what is now required are comparative case analyses.

An analytic framework that would focus upon the functions of military tasks, regional origins of personnel, and social status of armed forces personnel in relation to the broadening role of the middle sectors of society has been suggested by John

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9. Majid Khadduri, "The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics," American Political Science Review, XLVII (June, 1953), 511-542; and Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1960). See Annotations 56 and 39.

10. Lyle McAlister, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America," Journal of Inter-American Studies, III (July 1961), 341-350. See Annotation 42.

11. Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America.

Johnson of Stanford University.<sup>12</sup> However, this scheme applies only to contemporary Latin America. Similar efforts should be undertaken for the other developing areas of the world.

#### STATE OF KNOWLEDGE BY REGIONS OF THE WORLD

At this point, consideration of existing findings and conclusions on the role of the military in developing countries by geographical areas can provide us with a general perspective in this field of research. The manner of classification is arbitrary but useful. Preliminary conclusions indicate, for example, that military establishments in each area are developing along lines which reflect the changing patterns of political structure.

In the nations of the four major underdeveloped areas -- Latin America, Asia, The Middle East, and Africa -- the military, with some exceptions, is either the ruling political group or is the major institution in a position to support or to supplant the government. The military thus tends to have a major, if not controlling, voice in significant changes of policy or political control. At the very least, in most of the underdeveloped countries there is the possibility of a military takeover, should civilian power become inept, corrupt, or unsatisfactory in terms of military policy and purposes.

#### Latin America

##### Historical Background

Military dominance in the politics of Latin America can be traced back to the colonial rule of Spain and Portugal. The use of military force and the threat of

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12. John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

violence has been ingrained in Latin American political experience. The military leaders of the independence movements became the heroic political leaders. As they left the scene, lesser men, the caudillos, with their private regional armies became the determining influence in politics. Then, at the end of the 19th century, the power of the caudillo began to wane, as the national governments consolidated their control over heretofore semiautonomous regions. Militarism took on a national, rather than a local character. The international tensions of the early 1900's made the military elite receptive to help from the outside world, and foreign advisers appeared to give advice and direction on improving the efficiency of the Latin American armies, or at least of the officer corps.

As a consequence of such aid, the level of professional skill of the Latin American officer was improved. These European standards also bolstered the confidence of the military, thus increasing its independent political influence.

Although there appeared to be a move away from direct military rule at the end of World War II, the large-scale military aid inspired by the growing intensity of the cold war reversed the trend. Since 1953, the military has been largely in control of most of Latin America. There is at present, however, a broad range of types of government, including one-man dictatorships, military juntas, and civilian-controlled executives.

#### Political Roles

Attempts to categorize Latin America countries according to the extent of military influence in the political system have foundered in continual political flux. It does appear that, in the last few years, the military has tended to shape, direct, and control national governments, even where military men do not actually hold positions of administrative power.

Only Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Mexico have been able to develop an integrated civil-military bureaucracy that prevents military leaders from independently determining national policies. There are indications that Venezuela may be in the first stages of

reaching such a type of civil-military relationship, by continuing the process of legitimate civilian succession.

The industrial development of the area has also created new challenges for the military and has caused them to reconsider the nature of the civilian groups with which they ally themselves for political purposes.

#### Economic Role

Although the military in Latin America has on occasion engaged directly in economic activities, the evidence of their usefulness in such a role is somewhat inconclusive. The more significant economic aspects lie in the proportion of national expenditure devoted to the military establishment.

Most Latin American countries maintain defense budgets of 20 percent or more of total yearly expenditures. This is considered high for countries which have only limited military obligations. Much of the total is spent on advanced hardware and reflects status and prestige factors within and between given countries.

#### Social Roles

The social composition of the military has changed significantly since the end of World War II. The armed forces elite (and the potential elite) are no longer aligned with the traditional upper-class groups. The officer corps today is often recruited from the middle sectors of urban groups or from aspiring members of rural groups who have been exposed to new concepts of class structure, political articulation, and economic well-being. While this has most surely changed the character of the military establishment, recent events seem to indicate that the broader role of the military elite has not changed drastically. Though a certain degree of professionalization has taken place and the junta has replaced the caudillo, the armed forces still see themselves as interpreters of the political system and as judges of administrative rule.

### Military-Civilian Elite Relationships

While the military has abandoned its traditional alliance with the landed aristocracy and the church, it is not yet clear toward which groups in the civilian society the military as an institution is drawn. In many ways military leaders seem to remain a separate clique, distinct from other elements in the larger society. This identification problem is often reflected in divisions within the officer class itself. There are splits between officers of different services, those of different age groups, and those from rural and urban areas. These different characteristics within the military are more important than traditional distinctions of political philosophies.

### South and Southeast Asia

#### Historical Background

World War II marked the end of the colonial period in south and southeast Asia. Two general types of military establishments appeared. In India, Pakistan, and Burma, for example, there were already well-organized and equipped armies, led by trained, professional officers with a long tradition behind them. Other new nations such as Indonesia and Indochina had to unite different groups into a national military force; this was often done with the help of Western advisers. In the latter cases, national military and political institutions were organized simultaneously. In most of the new countries, the military, regardless of background, has tended to be the most stable element in the government.

#### Political Roles

Perhaps it is somewhat ironic that, while violence has played such an important part in Asian politics during the past 20 years, events have indicated that violence, per se, has not determined what specific role the military will play or what particular type of national government will emerge. Social scientists are still grappling with the question of which factors determine military roles and what dimensions of social

and political instability are associated with violence. It is interesting to note that in Thailand, where violence has been minimal, a military government now rules directly.

In south and southeast Asia, military caretaker governments have been predominant. In these cases the military has stepped into a situation of political and administrative chaos to centralize and solidify governmental control and then step aside. Many observers have felt that this was becoming the rule in south Asia, although in Burma, after completing this cycle, the military reassumed power. It appears that forming a caretaker government may become merely political justification for military intervention. However, military leaders in south Asia have been among the most frank in admitting their awareness of the complexities of national government.

#### Economic Roles

This problem area has received little attention. High defense budgets are the rule in Asian countries, justified by either threat of internal war or fear of aggressive neighbors. The military has often been quite outspoken, especially in Burma and South Korea, about its determination to promote administrative efficiency, fiscal responsibility, and business order. In general, there has been little indication that the military has either the long-range intentions or the capability of attaining these goals, although military direction of the planning and administration of plantations in Indonesia has been both efficient and effective.

#### Social Roles

The military establishments in Asia have generally reflected many of the class and ethnic divisions of their respective countries. There has been little social integration or enhancement of upward social mobility. Except in Korea, which most surely is an extraordinary case, there has been little indication that the military establishment has meaningfully promoted any image of national identity. On the contrary, military life has heightened many internal tensions, frequently with the result of



increasing the factionalization of both the military and the larger society.

#### Military-Civilian Elite Relationships

The military leadership has been drawn largely from traditional elite groups. Members have tended to come from the higher castes and the aristocratic families, which have, in the past at least, showed little consciousness of social, economic, and political problems. The commercial middle class has never been strongly represented in the officer corps. Military leaders seldom consider themselves a separate elite, and their cohesion with civilian leaders is pronounced.

#### Sub-Sahara Africa

Many of the new nations of sub-Sahara Africa have had difficulty in developing functional institutions with national identity, either military or nonmilitary. There are very few senior civil servants and even fewer military officers who are qualified for their roles. Many of the military men do have combat experience from World War II, when they were part of the British or the French Armed Forces, but the enforced discipline they once had under colonial leadership has largely broken down. The lack of equipment and qualified leaders has, perhaps, contributed to recent military interventions in politics. Many of the enlisted men have felt especially frustrated over inadequate pay scales and retirement benefits.

In some cases, such as Dahomey and Togo, small military or paramilitary bands led by one or two ambitious officers have totally disrupted national governments. On the other hand, African military personnel have performed very well under the leadership of United Nations commanders, and have shown discipline, tact, and patience -- attributes which are seldom to be found in their homeland environments.

There are indications that military establishments in this region have far closer ties to primitive folk and traditional ways of life than they do in other regions of the world. The role of the witch doctor during combat, the conflict between tribal and national loyalties, and the assimilation of kinship groupings into

the African enlisted man's daily military life are all in marked contrast to the usual notions of the role of the modern military force in developing nations. The extent to which these factors limit or attenuate possible military contributions to the processes of social, economic, and political change should become the subject of intensive research.

Even generalizations about the future role of the military in sub-Sahara Africa are difficult to make. The boundaries of the new states there are rather fluid, and it can be expected that new conditions and regroupings will take place. Present national armies may disappear or become synthesized with others in the next few years.

### Middle East and North Africa

#### Historical Background

The withdrawal of Western direction of the internal political affairs of the Middle East after World War II led to military dominance and factionalism in many of these states, particularly the Arab states. The continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, attendant upon the establishment of Israel, has given the role of the military primary importance in the states concerned.

The great diversity of the Middle East is reflected in the various roles of its armies. Where the military has supported a monarch, it has lent stability to the regime (in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Ethiopia, for example). Where one faction has conclusively triumphed, as in Egypt, the military has given direction to the state. Except for Algeria, the military has played a more secondary political role in North African states. The coups and countercoups of military factions in Syria and Iraq have led to governmental instability. They tend to ignore the basic problems which must be faced if an economic transformation is to take place. Military expenditures in themselves are extremely high, justified by the alleged threat of Israel. However, the Armed Forces often seem unable to carry out even their primary missions of external defense and internal security. It is therefore rather doubtful

that military personnel will show any great ability to formulate or to administer economic programs in the nonmilitary sectors.

In the North African states, including Egypt and Turkey, the military has been largely responsible for the revisions of economic policy which have been formulated and implemented in the past few years. The officer corps have professed themselves to be representative of an aspiring progressive class and have proved to be relatively dedicated to crucial economic aspects of nation-building.

#### Social Roles

In most of the smaller nations, the military has served to reinforce traditional class differentiation. The military elite does not appear to be especially interested in broadening the participant sectors of society, and so no concern for internal social mobility appears, even within the military establishment. Promotion and assignment are as likely to be based on personal relationships and contacts with the leadership group as on efficiency and administrative effectiveness.

The military elites in the larger states, notably in Egypt and Turkey, have acted as agents of profound social change, drastically affecting the national social system. Conscious efforts have been made to promote national identity, social integration, and professional cohesion. The military in these countries has reflected many of the rising expectations which are becoming so characteristic of the developing world. Attainment of its goals has been enhanced by the participation of the bureaucratic and entrepreneurial middle class, from which, it should be noted, the officer corps itself has been drawn.

#### Military-Civilian Elite Relationships

In the less progressive nations of the Middle East, the ruling cliques are made up of both civilians and the military. The cliques compete with each other for power, but their leaders have little or no concern with the mass population outside the politically articulate segments of society.

PART II

INVENTORY OF GENERAL STATEMENTS ON ROLES OF  
THE MILITARY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

## INTRODUCTION

This inventory was prepared by surveying the most pertinent and readily available literature. The selected statements represent a profile of the present state of knowledge about military roles in developing nations. Statements were selected and abstracted on the basis of three criteria of usefulness.<sup>1</sup> First, there must be a level of meaningful generality. Findings and conclusions were selected which identify and characterize major military roles in terms of key social processes and cultural elements. Second, there must be a significant degree of empirical evidence. Statements were selected for which some significant degree of empirical evidence does exist; those reflecting pure speculation by the author were rejected. Third, there must be a level of general agreement by major researchers. While there is some disagreement among researchers as to the consequences of military intervention in the sociopolitical process, there is a broad base of agreement concerning the correlates of social and political behavior of military establishments in developing nations. Statements which indicated a general agreement by major students of the military roles were chosen. These statements have been categorized according to the major roles that military establishments are likely to play as new states evolve. (See Table 1).

Each statement in the inventory is coded to indicate the author, source, and reference in the following manner: Pye, 16, (70). This indicates that the particular statement was drawn from page 16 of Pye's study, which appears in this report as reference 70. By turning to the author index for Part III, the reader can find that this reference is to be found on page 172 of the report. As indicated later in Part III, the majority of the references are annotated in detail.

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1. This system is similar to that employed by Berelson and Steiner in their inventory of social science findings. See Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964).

The statements appear as direct quotations without editing or paraphrasing. It is felt that this will give a more adequate indication of the variety of approaches to the study of changing military roles and that attempts to edit the statements would result in substantive changes in the author's original meaning.

TABLE 1. Roles of Military Establishments in Developing Countries

<u>Major Role</u>	<u>Characteristic Behavior and Action</u>
Mark of Sovereignty	Parades and other public ceremonies Symbolic and express support of the constitution
Internal Security	Patrol of the countryside Riot control Secret police actions Counterinsurgency operations
External Security	National defense Waging offensive warfare Diplomatic activities related to military security
Economic	Civic action Civil defense and disaster work Use of bureaucratic and managerial skills in country's economy Technical training of recruits
Social	Education and indoctrination of the populace Training in basic skills (literacy) Use of the military as a channel of mobility
Political	Decision-making on political policy Operating government agencies and bureaus Intervention in the political process

## MARK OF SOVEREIGNTY

1. Where armies serve as expeditionary forces, militarism has little chance to permeate the life of the nation; and there is more of the knight-errant in a merchant-adventurer than in an officer of the militia. Namier, 7, (90).
2. The military can very quickly acquire a sense of the nation and develop hostilities toward vested interests and parochial enclaves. The military organization itself, by recruiting from disparate groups throughout the society, can be an important socializing instrument, inculcating values that are nation-oriented. La Palombara, 31-32, (87).
3. ...military groups have a fundamental attachment to an abstract construction which they usually call the "nation" and toleration of the "state" depends in part on their proximity to civilian thinking, in part on the state's effective guardianship of what they consider to be national ideals. Kelly, 296, (68).
4. As for the interest groups themselves, the most dominant single force in Brazilian politics is without doubt the military establishment, notably the army. In itself, this is not a uniquely Brazilian phenomenon, as the history of a number of Latin American and Middle Eastern states readily attests. What is unusual is that the Brazilian army has since the establishment of the Republic in 1889 arrogated to itself the responsibility for the protection of constitutional government and its institutions. Baratz, 357, (24).



5. It is not impossible that the several [Indonesian] regional elites [Army authorities, among prajda and estate officials] might find themselves forced to make common cause in evading central policies for the sake of local interests, if the blanket national ideology of Socialisme a la Indonesia stifles all local initiative in the name of centralism and uniformity. Mackie, 355, (10).
6. The capacity for the military establishment in new nations to intervene in domestic politics derives from its distinctive military format, namely, its control of the instruments of violence; its ethos of public service and national identification; and its skill structure, which combines managerial ability with a heroic structure. Janowitz, 27-28, (67).

#### EXTERNAL SECURITY

1. The social history of nations is largely moulded by the forms and development of their armed forces, the primary aim of national organization being common defence. Namier, 6, (90).
2. A military group feels instinctively that it is the best judge of the national security interests; it regards this prescience as part of its raison d'etre. Kelly, 297, (68).
3. Military organization influences social structure mainly by determining the distribution of naked power, or, to use another word, the ability to use violence. Andrzejewski, 1, (63).

4. Other things being equal, the predominance of attack over defence promotes the territorial concentration of political power (centralization), while if defence becomes the stronger form of warfare, a trend towards the territorial dispersion of political power (decentralization) is likely to ensue. Andrzejewski, 75, (63).
5. Modern military technique produced two contrary effects. On the one hand, it strengthened the centripetal forces, by making subjugation of distant regions easier; but on the other hand, it fostered the disintegration of multination empires, because universal conscription became an unavoidable condition of military strength, and armies raised in this way were of little value unless permeated by patriotism. Andrzejewski, 83, (63).
6. There are three distinctive features of armies which seem to make them somewhat more dynamic centers in demanding changes. First of all, armies are by nature comparative institutions in the sense that their ultimate function is the test of one against the other. ... Second, armies for all their concern with rationality and becoming highly efficient machines are actually relatively immune to pragmatic tests of efficiency on a day to day basis.... Finally, armies always stand at some distance from their civilian societies and are expected to have ways of their own, including attitudes and judgements, that are isolated from civilian currents. Pye, 12-13, (70).
7. Armies commonly seize power on the domestic scene after defeat on the battlefield, not after victory. Rustow, 10, (58).

8. While in Spanish America militarism is a cultural residue of the wars of independence and the subsequent disorders, in Brazil it derives from the uncertainties arising from the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the overthrow of the Empire in 1889. Johnson, 244, (38).
9. The Brazilian Army, in particular, was an integrating force at the national level and an instrument of foreign policy. This new role of the armed forces had the effect of making military careers attractive to more serious and dedicated young men. Johnson, 247-248, (38).

#### INTERNAL SECURITY

1. The form of military organization determines to a very large extent the distribution of power, which in turn circumscribes the ability to revolt successfully. Andrzejewski, 158, (63).
2. If the compelling, uncompromising exigencies of military organization are sufficient to override tradition, war is in itself revolution. Namier, 7-8, (90).
3. When revolutions from below have taken place and fully matured, as in Mexico, Cuba, and Bolivia, one finds a relative absence of a politicalized military. In its place there has evolved a professional military, or some kind of civilian militia which offsets the political military. Horowitz, 34-35, (85).

4. Military concentration close to the vital centers encourages coups in Latin America, and is highly unstabilizing. Horowitz, 35, (85).
5. I am persuaded that the conduct of the Bengal Army in revolting against our authority was the conduct of men who were not so much the avengers of professional grievances as the exponents of general discontent. I shall show...that our government in India of late years has alienated or alarmed almost every influential class in the country. Disraeli, 5, (77).
6. Military coups follow upon a period of internal unrest in which civilian authorities have come increasingly to rely on armed forces to maintain themselves in power. Rustow, 11, (58).

#### NATION-BUILDING

##### Economic

1. ...the acculturation process in the army often tends to be more thorough and of broader scope than the urbanization process. ...the acculturation process in the army tends to be focused on the acquiring of technical skills that are of particular value for economic development. Pye, 16, (70).
2. ...the prestige of the military becomes identified increasingly in the public mind with technical competency. Lerner, 35, (48).
3. ...it is almost always those who wield the military power who form the supreme stratum of society. The pure plutocracy, the rule of the rich who do not control the military power can only be a temporary phenomenon. Purely economic factors produce,

no doubt, fluctuations in the height of stratification but...  
the long term trends are determined by the shifts of the locus  
of military power. Andrzejewski, 26, (63).

4. As long as the lieutenant only sees the Colonel giving orders like quick march and present arms, there is no great problem. When the lieutenant sees the Colonel making an ass of himself as Director of the Budget, it is only a matter of time before things start falling apart. Eder, 28, (79).
5. ...whereas the military can be very useful as a limited instrument of economic development, its utility and effectiveness greatly diminish as it moves toward complete control of the social system. La Palombara, 33, (87).
6. Clearly, if army living standards are superior to those prevailing in much of the surrounding civilian society--as now seems to be the case--the young discharged soldier is likely to find his traditional society inadequate to sustain his new level of expectations. Lerner, 34, (48).
7. ...the army did offer opportunities for prestige and advancement, as well as a comfortable life, for sons of middle and lower class families. Torrey, 55, (50).
8. The army has emerged as the most progressive element in Arab society today, as the Army Officer Corps appears to be the most willing among Arab groups to seek empirically rational solutions to outstanding problems--to resolve situations on the basis of fact. Vatikiotis, 240-241, (51).

9. It may be a coincidence but it is certainly very significant that no military regime ever seriously modified the concentration of landed property and that the only countries which managed to achieve a true land reform dissolved their army and either substituted for it a workers militia (Cuba and Bolivia) or a new army (Mexico). Germani, 17, (82).
10. That the nation [Brazil] has been able to survive the incredibly rapid transition to industrialization without discarding its basic political structure is due in no small part to the army. Manchester, 175, (89).

#### Social

1. The consequence of Westernization in all of these countries (of the non-western world) has been the deterioration and breakdown of the traditional way of life and social and political structures. The one institution that was preserved--and, indeed, invigorated--in some non-Western nations was the army. Sharabi, 352, (61).
2. ...armies in the newly emergent countries come to play key roles in the acculturative process through which traditional ways give way to more westernized ideas and practices. Pye, 14, (70).
3. Probably the most significant feature of the acculturation process as it takes place under the auspices of the army is that it provides a relatively high degree of psychological security. Pye, 15, (70).

4. In the new nations, the military establishment is recruited from the middle and lower-middle classes, drawn mainly from rural areas or hinterlands. In comparison with western European professional armies, there is a marked absence of a history of feudal domination. As a result, the military profession does not have strong allegiance to an integrated upper class which it accepts as its political leader nor does it have a pervasive conservative outlook. Military education contributed to an innovating outlook toward modernization. Janowitz, 28, (67).
5. Along with the physical and social mobility opened to them through the military training program, they acquired also the habits of psychic mobility. Lerner, 32, (48).
6. Politically the most significant feature of the process of acculturation within the army is that it usually provides some form of citizenship training. Pye, 17, (70).
7. The spirit of military-inspired nationalism often encompasses a host of personalized emotions and sentiments about the civilian society which all stems from the fact that the army generally represents one of the most effective channels for upward social mobility. Pye, 18, (70).
8. The question whether conscription made society good or bad cannot be answered on scientific grounds alone as it involves normative judgements. But there can be no doubt that it fostered egalitarian reforms. Andrzejewski, 116, (63).

9. The cohesion of the armed forces tends to produce the cohesion of the body politic. Subordination within the armed forces tends to produce subordination in the whole body politic. It has stratificatory effect, as it requires a hierarchy, but on the other hand, it has a levelling tendency. Andrzejewski, 139, (63).
10. If M. P. R. (Military Participation Ratio) is very high, the armed forces at their full strength comprise the whole adult male population. Then during a war or the period of preparedness for it, the inner structure of the armed forces is practically coextensive with the totality of the social structure. In an extremely militant society such coalescence becomes permanent. In such a situation the factors which determine the degree of hierarchization of the armed forces also determine whether the political organization will be democratic or monocratic, or something between the two poles.

If the professional warriors are the dominating stratum, the inner structure of the armed forces determines whether the state is an absolute monarchy or some other form of monocracy, or whether it is an oligarchic republic. Andrzejewski, 91, (63).
11. The "army"... is a multiple, less well organized, and sometimes contradictory thing, as much a state of mind, perhaps, as a concrete force impinging on politics. Fitzgibbon, 54, (37).
12. It is understandable why the numerical growth of the armed forces-- which may occur either through the natural growth of the population, or through expansion of the state, or through the extension of military service--fosters their hierarchization and monocratization. Andrzejewski, 96, (63).



13. While it is impossible to identify a military ideology in new nations, common ideological themes are found which help to explain the professional officer's political behavior. These include a strong sense of nationalism, a puritanical outlook, acceptance of government control of social and economic change, and a deep distrust of organized civilian politics. As a result of social background, education, and career experiences, military personnel of the new nations become interested in politics, but they maintain a strong distrust of organized politics and civilian political leaders.

The ability of officers to intervene in domestic politics and produce stable leadership is related to internal social cohesion. The military establishments of new nations differ markedly in their internal social cohesion because of differences in training, indoctrination, operational experiences, and intergenerational cleavages. Janowitz, 28-29, (67).

14. The officer corps has shifted its style of life from a relatively isolated group, residing mainly in its own community, to a profession with elaborate, though transitory, contacts with civilian society. Janowitz, 177, (67).

15. Even general education may be identified with the military in the public mind, by reason of the large-scale program of basic education now being instituted by the Turkish army. Lerner, 35, (48).

16. The military corps [In Turkey] became, in this decade, a major agency of social change precisely because it spread among this key sector of the population a new sense of identity--and new skills and concepts as well as new machines. Lerner, 32, (48).

17. With the importation of European military instructors...the army officer corps became one of the most Westernized elements in the Turkish Empire. The officer corps had always had a wide base of social and geographic recruitment; as a result of the nineteenth-century reforms, it also became one of the most conspicuous channels for merit advancement within the empire's social structure, Rustow, 515, (59).
18. The Turkish army could be entrusted with major programs that shaped national development--basic education, technical training, industrial production--so long as the civilian leadership generated the ideas and shaped the institutions which made these services' programs functional for the society as a whole. Lerner, 41, (48).
19. What is most urgently needed in Southeast Asia today is organizational strength...At the present level of development...the remedy is more likely to be found in the officer corps than among the politicians. ...in Southeast Asia ways must be found to utilize the organizational strength of the national armies and the leadership potential of their officer corps as temporary kernels of national integration. Pauker, 342-343, (92).
20. ...the army has found itself to be...a crucible of deepseated antagonistic forces in Indonesian society, some directed against the Chinese minority, some expressive of a more general uncertainty and frustration, others again being simply opportunistic. van der Kroef, 17-18, (16).
21. It must be emphasized that the Army, which has now captured power in Pakistan, is a new institution and not a new social or economic class. In Pakistan ...Army officers are usually from the old wealthy landowning families. Sayeed, 73, (13).

22. The Japanese army, as a political entity, is not the million peasants who spend a couple of years in barracks. It is the corps of officers, the men who have made military service their profession. That army is a hierarchy on a democratic base. The officers are ambitious, energetic youths from good poor families. Byas, 133, (76).
23. If one accepts the thesis that the army officer corps is the most cohesive Westernized group in Arab society today, one must argue that this corps is the natural leader of secular nationalism. Vatikiotis, 195, (51).
24. The army Officer Corps has appeared as the group most inclined to push Arab society into the modern age by its serious commitment to secular policies and institutions. Vatikiotis, 241, (51).
25. Despite the Army Officer Corps vanguard position as a professional class providing political leadership for a guided revolution aiming at long term change, the power elite within the Corps will have to create a social class on which to center its organizational strength. Vatikiotis, 244, (51).
26. Until 1895 disorder was compounded by rivalries between the monarchist-inclined [Brazilian] navy which considered itself aristocratic and ethnically pure, and the republican, democratically inclined army, whose officers were of more moderate social origin, some of them having Indian or Negro blood in their veins. Johnson, 193, (38).
27. Except in Brazil, where officers contributed significantly to technological development, natural science, and development of the hinterland, the training that the professional soldier received still did little to contribute constructively to civilian life. And nowhere had professionalism led

officers to transfer their loyalty away from audacious leaders to the military as an institution; when they looked to politics, they continued to look to a leader, and not toward doctrines. Johnson, 247, (38).

#### Political

1. In the absence of well-organized political parties, there is in a moment of crisis no force other than the army, capable of maintaining order and promoting the public welfare. Salem, 107, (60).
2. The "takeover" of power by the military in new nations has generally followed the collapse of efforts to create democratic-type institutions; the military has tended not to displace the single mass party authoritarian political regimes. After "takeover", the military regime faces the task of supplying national political leadership and of developing mass support for its programs. While this phase is only emerging, the evidence seems to indicate that, if the military is to succeed in this political goal, it must develop a political apparatus outside of the military establishment but under its direct domination. Janowitz, 29, (67).
3. Military might is likely to be a decisive factor in politics in a society where there are no crystallized and universally accepted beliefs about the legitimacy of power: where there are doubts and disagreements about who should occupy the positions of command and what orders he is entitled to give. Andrzejewski, 105-6, (63).
4. ...as compared with other institutions and bureaucracies, it is assumed that the military establishment has a variety of common organizational features. These common features condition and limit the capacity of the military profession to exercise political power. Janowitz, 24, (67).

5. While there has been a trend towards "civilianizing" the military profession, the officer corps in the new nations have important limitations in producing those leadership skills in bargaining and political communication that are required for sustained political leadership. These limitations include the absence of a tradition for dealing with clients and publics outside the military. Janowitz, 27, (67).
6. An army is necessarily built up on graduation of rank, and universal military service has imbued the continental nations with hierarchical conceptions; even posts in the civil service were in many countries assimilated to ranks in the army. Namier, 7, (90).
7. The military establishment, traditionally conservative and often allied with the Church in defense of vested interests, is, paradoxically, one of the potentially brightest spots in the picture of Latin American democracy. Fitzgibbon, 55, (37).
8. The Army has, of course, historically been the prime instrument of oligarchic domination in Latin America. Its officer corps has been overwhelmingly recruited from aristocratic and merchant families. In the twentieth century it has proved a certain limited escalator for sons of professional families and white-collar groups. But the attraction of right-militarist ideologies has nearly always neutralized the class origin of these new entrants, and absorbed them into a reactionary and repressive elite. The innumerable coups and counter-coups which mark the Latin American scene have normally been essentially sub-political products of inter-service or inter-officer rivalry. The oligarchic character and role of the armed forces has remained unaltered. Blackburn, 70, (74).

9. When the military retreats behind the scenes, it does so mainly because it desires a respite from the mundane job of running the civilian government, as well as from the in-fighting that usually develops among its politically active factions. Etzioni, 14, (80).
10. The military [In Latin America] does not always exercise exclusive control, although it may occupy the government palace or the barracks behind it. Almost invariably it forms a coalition with some other group, such as the landlords, the industrialists, or even the labor unions. In other words, it tends to tolerate a range of policies consistent with its views and acts mainly as a powerful veto group. Etzioni, 13, (80).
11. The basis of participation in public life, both political and economic, is broadening and, as it does, the operational orbit within which the army is free to move correspondingly narrows...although it is a highly intangible thing, it may well be that the army is developing a civic consciousness which persuades at least some of its officers that it should seriously restrict its traditional participation in politics. Fitzgibbon, 56, (37).
12. The case of the Army in Brazil is somewhat distinct. Where no doubt some professional liberals will rail against the spectacle of generals interfering with the governing of nations, the Brazilian version of this cliché is still totally different from the Argentinian, or, to pass to the ridiculous, the Guatemalan. First, the Brazilian Army has a certain *sérieux*, acquired from actually participating in professional activity (from World War II to present, with the U.N.); and second, it has long had a bias toward constitutional limitation of its own power. One is

surprised more by its forbearance than by its final intervention.  
Botsford, 4, (75).

13. The Cuban Revolution that brought Fulgencio Batista to power in 1933 was unique in being a mutiny of the rank and file, which toppled the old officer corps along with the government. Lieuwen, 61, (39).
14. ...as far as the armed forces [in Brazil] especially the army were concerned, there was a world of difference between the monarchy and the republic. In the monarchy they had played a secondary role until practically the last moment. In the republic they assumed a primary role from the outset. Johnson, 192-193, (38).
15. ...if the wear and tear of governing is prolonged, it is likely to reduce the armed forces to the level of a political group in the eyes of the country. This would destroy the prestige that allowed them to intervene in a crisis. Eder, 28, (79).
16. In times of peace a decent air of reserve was usually worn over the army's power. There is nothing secret about it and the army marches into the political stage without hesitation when it meets resistance on matters it considers vital. Byas, 136, (76).
17. The instrument by which the [Japanese] army can veto the formation of an administration is the regulation which ordains that the war minister must be a general or a lieutenant general from the active list. This provision makes the war minister's post a keystone of any cabinet; if the stone is not in its place an administration cannot be formed, if it is pulled out the administration falls. Byas, 141, (76).

18. It could hardly be said that the [Indonesian] army was ever indifferent to politics; but unlike the armies in Latin America, Thailand, or Pakistan, the Indonesian army has preferred exercising political power behind the scenes to the establishment of a military junta. Higgins, 124, (84).
19. President Soekarno's plan for "political reform" in 1959 was the desire to eliminate the party system in Indonesia. From the time of Indonesian independence, Soekarno has been a foe of political parties because they have challenged his desire of setting up a unitary state and abolishing any remnants of a federal nation.

The army, since the establishment of the state of emergency in March 1957, has taken increasing responsibility for the government of the country, particularly at the provincial level. Army commanders (known as regional war administrators) have become more and more incensed with partisan politics and the inability of elected councils to act, while at the central level the Army leaders regard parties as the source of corruption, confusion and inefficient government. The army then, was as eager as the President to abolish parties, or at least to limit their prerogatives. In this way, support for sweeping change (popular feeling and the army) was growing while the obstacles to such changes were being discredited. Tinker, 178, (94).

20. Military domination of the government (of Thailand) is largely to be explained by the psychological and political vacuum created with the sudden overthrow of the absolute monarchy in which the military leaders had replaced the traditional loyalty to the king with a coerced loyalty based on superior arms. Darling, 168, (21).



21. ...like most soldiers he [the Prime Minister of Thailand] has upheld the need for authority and order as the only effective basis for national independence and prosperity. Darling, 170, (21).
22. Civilian supremacy had been maintained in Turkey because the government code of the Turkish Republic was founded upon the mystique of civilian supremacy. Lerner, 19, (48).
23. ...by contrast with many other modernizing societies, the military sector in Turkey had been contained because the civilian sector had been relatively successful and the military had nothing better to offer. Lerner, 22, (48).
24. The action of May 27 [1960], like any coup by officers of the middle rank, strained the discipline of the forces. Generals in command of armies or corps were unlikely to accept orders from a self-appointed junta of their juniors who only yesterday were attached to regimental staffs. Rustow, 524, (59).
25. We note simply the relative success of civilian leadership in controlling, while utilizing, military personnel and resources. When the court crumbles and the intelligensia is incapacitated, only then men of the sword remain capable of taking over political control. Lerner, 23-24, (48).
26. Armed coups d'etat occur when mounting popular dissatisfaction can find no peaceful means of forcing a change in government. Rustow, 12, (58).

27. The suspension of democratic life in favor of military rule, although greeted with almost universal approval, has its own weaknesses and evil influences. Most dangerous of all seems to be the difficulty in persuading the army, once the job of overhauling is done, to withdraw from politics or relinquish power. Khadduri, 522, (56).
28. While the military has reduced the danger of right or left rule, a greater difficulty has arisen. Once the army officers were firmly installed in the saddle, how could they be removed from their newly won positions? Khadduri, 524, (56).
29. The tendency toward military control is not hard to explain against the background of recent history in the Middle East: the principle of de facto control of the state by the military establishment. In all the Middle Eastern countries that have experienced military coups d'etat since the second world war, the shift has not been from democracy to dictatorship, but simply from one form of nondemocratic rule to another. Sharabi, 281, (93).
30. In the final analysis it will be found that political life in the Middle East has two bases: personal power and military supremacy. Unlike the West, where, as Max Weber pointed out, this phenomenon manifests itself from within the rational legal structure of the state, in the Middle East it expresses itself in "charismatic" and traditional leadership. Sharabi, 339, (61).
31. ...there are often widening rifts within the military juntas installed by a coup. Rustow, 13, (58).

32. It is the officers, rather than the soldiers, who have been instrumental in involving the army in politics....Moved by patriotism as well as by personal ambition, many high school graduates enter the law colleges or military academies with the idea that a career in law or the military service is a stepping stone to high government position. Khadduri, 517 (56).
33. Lack of agreement on basic constitutional principles, inexperience with government by discussion, weakness of civilian bureaucracies, atrophy of political parties, and diffuseness of economic interests groups--all of these contribute to an atmosphere where violence becomes not only the ultima ratio, but all too often the prima ratio of politics. Rustow, 12 (58).
34. During the last half-century, it has become increasingly evident in the Middle East that the only effective agency of internal political change is not the political party but the physical might of the military establishment. Sharabi, 353, (61).
35. ...the army, like all the other national organizations, was inevitably involved in the struggle between the oligarchs and the new generation. Khadduri, 47, (46).
36. Closely related to the rise of military rule is the question of why the democratic regime in Iraq collapsed, thereby leaving an opening to the army to intervene Khadduri, 49, (46).

37. The problem...facing the army rulers as the self-styled and, possibly, the only available agents of social, economic, and political change is not what new ideology to foster, but how to devise one. Vatikiotis, 194, (62).
38. The political triumph of the Egyptian revolution and its adoption of the Damascus brand of Arab nationalism has introduced a new factor into the political life of the Middle East--namely, the reintroduction of the old principle of de facto control of the state by military autocracy. Sharabi, 351, (61).
39. Not only has the Army Officer Corps in the U.A.R. been conscious of its progressive role in the political and economic evolution of the Arab world, but it has proposed to impose change on members of a society who have long lacked organization and civic spirit. Vatikiotis, 242, (51).
40. Lacking proper political organization and being unable to break through the old political structure, the civilian professional and commercial groups in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab countries were superseded by the military. Vatikiotis, 247, (51).
41. ...the accession of the military to political power in Egypt was not a particularly revolutionary phenomenon in the annals of that country. [Egyptian] National or foreign armies, especially when serving as arms of a ruling monarch or class, have always influenced and sanctioned the making of policy. Vatikiotis, 259, (51).

42. ...there is, in fact, a constant according to which the armed forces of Brazil are performing a function in the Republic formerly fulfilled in our country [Brazil] by the Crown. Freyre, 48, (81).
43. The central role of the army in the general evolution of Arab nationalism is not a new or sudden development. Indeed, the concept of the army outside politics is unknown to the last two generations of Arabs. Vatikiotis, 199, (62).
44. This control of government by the military is indicative both of serious defects in democratic processes in the Middle East and of the eagerness with which Middle Eastern leaders seek high political office. Khadduri, 511, (56).

PART III

ANNOTATIONS AND REFERENCES

## INTRODUCTION

The last section of this report presents the references upon which Part I and Part II are based. Since the report is to be used by researchers, students specializing in given areas of the world, and others desiring specific knowledge of this problem area, the usual author-title bibliography was replaced by a detailed annotated bibliography. The following pages contain not only a listing of authors and their works but also 73 detailed annotations.

These have been classified according to the following sequential scheme: by regions of the world with which the study deals, by type of reference (case studies and essays), and alphabetically by author and title of the work. Case studies include those articles and books which focus upon a particular problem concerning military roles within a specific place or time frame. In contrast, essays deal on a more generalized level with larger trends or processes as they apply to major regions or areas of the world. In an oversimplified sense, case studies represent empirical analyses of particular problems or hypotheses, while essays are more characteristically general attempts to construct larger theories.

In addition, each annotation indicates the nature of the contents. Annotations of essays, where applicable, identify the primary theme or theory of the author, his rationale or evidence, his interpretations, and the reviewer's comments. Case studies are organized to indicate the

time-place-problem focus of the research, the nature of the socioeconomic and political-governmental environment, the institutional and personnel characteristics of the military establishment, the specific roles of the military, the author's conclusions, and the reviewer's comments. Full length books are summarized in a fashion to permit the clearest elucidation of the subject matter, which often includes a variety of case studies or essays.

In each annotation the reviewer's comments were designed to indicate the unique or special contribution of the source in relation to the larger body of literature, to assess the character of depth of the work in comparison with other available sources, and to delineate for academic and military readers the special relevance or use of the work for further research and study. The reviewer's comments are the sole responsibility of the author and in no way should be interpreted as indicating the official position of Special Operations Research Office or the Department of the Army.

At the end of the annotations is included a short list of unannotated references. These sources were not annotated for a number of reasons. In some cases the books were received too late for annotation. Some of the works are companion pieces to larger studies, often by the same writers, already included in the annotations. Nevertheless, these sources are important and meaningful contributions to our knowledge about military roles. Their appearance in a separate listing in no way implies a secondary or tangential quality.

A survey of these references as they are organized quickly discloses further needs for research. For example, few case studies,



or for that matter essays, are available on Africa. In contrast, Latin America and the Middle East have received the overwhelming attention of scholars. It is also interesting to note that Asian case studies are far more plentiful than attempts to develop theoretical essays about military roles in that region. This is undoubtedly a consequence of the enormous variation of military roles and structures in Asia. Scholars and students may find this type of analysis of research sources useful in planning future studies.

## AFRICA

### Case Studies

#### Annotation 1

Title: "The Independent States of Africa and their Armies" (tr. from Bulletin d'Information des Armées).

Reference: General Military Review, X (December 1960), 669-683.

#### Summary

The former French African countries' military establishments were organized and trained by French military officials. The French consciously imbued these men with the spirit of racial equality, ethnic intergration, decency, and honor. Since independence, France has continued to aid and advise these armies. The existence of disciplined armies may be the factor which will allow these countries to "follow the good path."

1. Locus: Sub-Sahara Africa.

Tempus: Present.

Focus: The influence of France on African armies.

2. National environment.

- a. Socioeconomic situation: States whose social and economic well-being depend on the behavior of their armed forces.
- b. Political-governmental situation: Nations which require a disciplined army, supporting the national government, in order to maintain internal security.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

- a. Institutional: Armies whose skills and capabilities can be attributed to French training and instruction.
- b. Personnel: After World War II, France made great efforts to train qualified officers for leadership after independence.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

- a. Political: French military training programs were responsible for instilling a spirit of patriotism in the men of these African armies.
- b. Social: French colonial military policy of encouraging racial equality and ethnic integration has helped these armies maintain a national character.
- c. Educational: Beginning under colonial administration and continuing after independence, African candidates have been educated in French military academies; and the French are helping to provide military preparatory schools at the present time.

5. Effects of military roles and activities: The success of the newly independent African states depends on the quality of their armies. Mutinies of African armies, such as the one

that occurred in the Congo in 1960, have a drastic effect on the welfare of these states.

6. Author's conclusions: All characteristics of armies in former French African territories are a result of French military and colonial policy, including post-independence aid.
7. Reviewer's comments: Although France must be given due credit for the quality of these military establishments, the impression is given that the quality is always high, and this is somewhat doubtful according to evidence in other sources.

Annotation 2

Author: Marshall, S. L. A.

Title: "Black Soldier's Burden".

Reference: Army, XII (August 1961), 26-29.

Summary

The political and economic chaos existing in the Congo is due largely "to the failure of military force and the lack of military control." The army reflects many of the failings of other national institutions: no leadership, little allegiance, and no discipline. Those officers who are serious about their mission have no knowledge of command and leadership; and while many talk about reorganization and improved training and efficiency, little is done about it.

1. Locus: Sub-Sahara Africa.

Tempus: 1961.

Focus: Shortcomings of the military.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: Public administration, public health, transportation, and trade and commerce are paralyzed. A national consensus is nonexistent.

"Educationally, the Congo is only one notch above the jungle level. Not one person now in power is a member of the learned professions."

b. Political-governmental situation: A situation exists in which a "government which does not govern is served by an army which is not commanded."

3. Characteristics of military establishment.
  - a. Institutional: The army is a functionally illiterate institution.
  - b. Personnel: The men who hold the rank of officer have little or no qualifications for leadership.
4. Roles of the military establishment.
  - a. Political: The absence of discipline or leadership in the army is a major reason for the lack of political stability.
  - b. Social: Military personnel maintain many traditional family and kinship patterns while they are in uniform. Wives (sometimes more than one) and children live on base.
  - c. Economic: The government feeds and clothes each military family.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The present character of the national army in the Congo prevents it from carrying out its primary mission of maintaining national security.
6. Author's conclusions: Immediate reform is needed. "The Congolese Army could be reconstructed without too much trouble, saving possibly one-third of the men now on the roster, and eliminating the greater number who are interested mainly in adding to the national census."
7. Reviewer's comments: Although this is a brief study, the author points out the many ways in which this army is far removed from concepts of modernization or westernization.

## Essays

### Annotation 3

Authors: Coleman, James, and Belmont Brice.

Title: The Role of the Military in Sub-Sahara Africa," The Role of The Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Ed. John J. Johnson.

Reference: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

#### Summary

The different organizations and roles of African military units in British, French, and Belgian territories have had a profound influence on the character of the armies in these new states today. With the exception of the Sudan, most characteristics of military establishments are as yet undetermined. Much depends on the future role of former European colonizers in the military establishments in sub-Sahara Africa and the degree of success of civilian rule.

1. Locus: Sub-Sahara Africa.

Tempus: Present.

Focus: The emerging character and role of military establishments.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: Nations are in the first stages of economic development, in which the elite is largely civilian, and the army has not amalgamated ethnic and tribal groups.

b. Political-governmental situation; Civilian ruling groups have not yet been faced with a military strong and cohesive enough to challenge their rule. Events in the Sudan and the Congo may be indicators for determining future political problem areas.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

- a. Institutional: Armies lack a trained and efficient officer corps. Many have European advisers in commanding positions. Recruits are largely grouped along ethnic and regional lines.
  - b. Personnel: Young officers trained abroad are beginning to show evidence of discontent with the abilities of civilian ruling groups. Veterans are also showing signs of being displeased with the opportunities available in civilian life for using their skills.
4. Roles of the military establishment.
- a. Political: With the exception of the Sudan, which seems to be developing in the manner that Turkey developed, no political roles are discernible.
  - b. Social: Military establishments give indication of upsetting the traditional social patterns, which have been based on ethnic, religious, and tribal factors.
  - c. Educational: The large percentage of functionally illiterate recruits are given elementary training upon entering the armed services. Officers often complete training courses abroad.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The degree of violence, the increasing complexity of government administration, and the interest of world powers in African military establishments will have a profound effect on the developing nature and role of armies in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, patterns of recruitment

and attitudes of junior officers will determine whether the present civilian ruling groups will be challenged in the political arena by military elements. There appears to be little doubt that they will be.

6. Author's conclusions: It is clear that...African armies are...the least developed in the contemporary world. It is impossible...to present any firm conclusions or...meaningful generalizations regarding the behavior of African armies."
7. Reviewer's comments: The authors' discussion of military institutions under colonial regimes is well-done, but they do not give an adequate presentation of the contemporary social and political roles of military institutions.



Annotation 4

Author: Gutteridge, William.

Title: Armed Forces in New States.

Reference: London: Oxford University Press. 1962.

Summary

A general introduction to the range of functions and the operations of the armed forces in the newly independent states of Commonwealth Africa as well as a specific analysis of the public image of the military and its relation to colonial experience is given. Officer corps composition and actual and possible political activities are given for Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Sudan, and Sierra Leone.

In this latter context, the author comes to the following conclusions: (1) "The majority of new states inherit armies from colonial powers previously responsible for their administration... [but] regional or continental influence may depend on the size, efficiency, and ceremonial performance of these national defense forces." (2) Evidence, though almost as diverse as the number of instances, so far suggests that two related factors ultimately tend to determine the role of the armed forces in other than a strictly military capacity: their composition, especially that of the officer corps, and their social standing and prestige in the eyes of the community. (3) The officers constitute a relatively prominent proportion of the national leadership elite. They may therefore have close connections with senior civil servants and police officers or, more significantly, politicians. They are generally part of a small reservoir of educated men. Their regional, ethnic, or tribal origin is consequently of great importance.

(4) "The degree and style of education received in Western European or Soviet bloc countries will contribute significantly to the patterns of political developments in these new states."

Reviewer's Comments

The author does not explain the involvement of the armed forces in the nonexternal defense processes going on in these developing nations. His discussion of the contribution of British military and colonial personnel to the training and discipline of specific military units made up of African troops is valuable, but does not offer any framework for identifying present civil-military relations, patterns, or possible future trends.

ASIA

Case Studies

Annotation 5

Author: Bone, Robert C.

Title: "New Hope in Indonesia?"

Reference: Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXXV (October 1, 1955), 13-15.

Summary

The role of the army in the resignation of the Communist-supported nationalist government in August 1955 signified the emergence of a new cohesive political force in Indonesia. The rising influence of the army may serve to cleanse the Indonesian political elite of inefficiency and corruption.

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 1955.

Focus: The emergence of the army as a political force.

2. National environment.

a. Political-governmental situation: In 1953, the leader of the Indonesian Nationalist Party ruled with the support of the Indonesian Communist Party. This coalition had as its opposition the Socialists and the religiously oriented Masjumi political forces. The military became politically active as a group when the prime minister tried to appoint a chief of staff without the army's approval. This led to the resignation of the cabinet.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: Before 1955, the army was regarded merely as a force to be manipulated by different political groups. Its actions since have given it "a new-found unity of purpose and apparent dedication to efficient and honest government."

b. Personnel: High army officers were sensitive to what they considered interference in military affairs without their consultation. When the civilian government tried to impose conditions which were not acceptable to them, they took steps to assure that their area of decision and command were not overruled

4. Roles of the military establishment.

a. Political: The reaction of the armed forces to an unprecedented government decision introduced a new and significant factor into Indonesian politics: the army was now an independent variable in the political process.

5. Effects of military roles and activities: The whole character of the ruling process altered. The interests and opinions of military leaders had to be carefully considered. The army, in effect, held a veto power over the decisions of the president.
6. Author's conclusions: The rising influence of the Armed Forces in politics may serve as a constructive force in eliminating some of the Communist-inspired economic and foreign policies which prevailed before 1955.
7. Reviewer's comments: Events of the middle 1950's gave some indication that Indonesia would be able to develop stable economic and political policies. One can easily understand the nature of this hope. Unfortunately this author's cautious predictions, along with those of many other experts on Indonesian politics, have not been fulfilled.

Annotation 6

Author: Butwell, Richard.

Title: "The New Political Outlook in Burma."

Reference: Far Eastern Survey, XXIX (February 1960), 21-27.

Summary

The caretaker government of General Ne Win has significantly changed the character of Burmese national politics, even though the reins of national government have been returned to civilians. In the future, "decisions will partly be made by the politicians on the basis of how they will be received by the military." The army now controls the

newly-created National Solidarity Associations (citizens' groups in rural areas), which will play a political role of their own in Burmese politics.

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 1958-1960.

Focus: The new military political role in Burma.

2. National environment.

a. Political-governmental situation: The nation's top military chief became Burma's political leader in 1958 when Premier U Nu stepped aside voluntarily. Elections were held in February 1960 and U Nu was returned to power constitutionally. The military will, however, continue to be a factor of definite political importance.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

- a. Institutional: The military gained a popular reputation of being efficient administrators on various government boards and agencies and have been given credit for eliminating some of the worst aspects of corruption.
- b. Personnel: Although the cabinet under General Ne Win was largely civilian, military personnel held key administrative posts in economic and security agencies.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

a. Political: Although the military has relinquished direct command of the national government, it has created a new political base of its own. The precedent it has established will forever be a factor, and the National Solidarity

Associations, which it controls, serves as an organized mass political force.

- b. Social: The military caretaker government initiated a program of cleaning out the slum areas of Rangoon and other cities.
  - c. Economic: Military personnel have participated in road-building projects, garbage collection, and other clean-up campaigns.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The people of Burma have seen that a government can be run relatively honestly with high standards of competence. Politicians will now have to live up to these standards if they are to win the support of the military elite and the educated public.
6. Author's conclusions: Any civilian government will be influenced from now on by the existence of an army which will not forget that it ruled with relative success.
7. Reviewer's comments: The author clearly indicates a possibility for a reintervention by the Burmese Army in politics. This did indeed take place within 2 years of the writing of this article.

Annotation 7

Author: Gady, John F.

Title: "Burma's Military Regime."

Reference: Current History, XXXIIX (February 1960), 75-81.

Summary

The rising tensions between factions of the Anti-Fascist Peoples

Freedom League and the growing threat to national stability by insurgent political and paramilitary groups led Prime Minister U Nu to invite General Ne Win to assume executive power in October 1958. His task was to halt the deterioration of law and order so as to set the stage for peaceful general elections. Elections were not held on schedule, and while democracy has been eroding away, there has been a shift to the West in foreign policy orientation.

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 1945-1960.

Focus: Political actions of the military.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: By 1958, the image of national unity, which seemed to have existed from the time of independence after World War II, had broken down into dangerous tensions among the various ethnic groups of the country. In addition, the threat of Communist revolt was becoming increasingly imminent.

b. Political-governmental situation: The Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League, which had been the dominant political group in Burma since the end of the war, was torn by factions. President U Nu, who also headed the party, was unable to control the various feuding groups. His resignation as chief executive was brought about partly by his desire to devote all his time to remolding the party elite.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: Generally a strong anti-Communist institution,

the army was becoming increasingly impatient with insurgent military groups which, for political reasons, it was not able to combat with full force.

b. Personnel: General Ne Win, who appeared as the strong military man from the beginning of the political crisis, had little patience with civilian politicians, whom he considered to be incompetent and corrupt. Although presiding over a caretaker government, he was to set the limits of national policy far beyond his initial mandate.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

a. Political: The military, acting as a temporary national executive, was in fact the dominant political force.

b. Social: Military units were mobilized to raze several slum areas of Rangoon and to man garbage-collection teams. This was a part of General Ne Win's desire to be accepted as legitimate by the population of the capital city.

5. Effects of military roles and activities: The military regime implemented a decisive change in the orientation of Burmese foreign policy. The somewhat dubious neutralist policies of U Nu were abandoned in favor of more sympathetic attitudes toward the West. The armed forces began to develop vested interests of their own after being in power for 6 months, their given mandate for executive control. When General Ne Win was elected by parliament in February 1959, the chances for a competitive democratic political system's developing in the near future greatly diminished.



6. Author's conclusion: While political parties will function in Burma, they will not rule. This will be the task of the military.
7. Reviewer's comments: The author's prediction proved to be correct. There is now little challenge to military domination of politics in Burma.

Annotation 8

Author: Feith, Herbert, and Daniel S. Lev.

Title: "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion."

Reference: Pacific Affairs, XXXIV (Spring 1963), 32-46.

Summary

The Indonesian rebellion of 1956 was a direct challenge to the "guided democracy" of President Sukarno. Directed largely by military commanders stationed outside Java, the regionalists hoped to employ military tactics in order to better their political bargaining position with the central government. The lack of cohesiveness among the insurgent leaders and the willingness of the central government's military high command to act as arbitrator helped to bring the rebellion to an end. The most important result of the end of hostilities was the elimination of any significant opposition to the Sukarno regime.

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 1956-1961.

Focus: Military factions during civil war.

2. National environment.

- a. Socioeconomic situation: Indonesia was an ethnically diverse country in which opposition to the domination of national

economic and governmental institutions by one ethnic group, the Javanese, was mounting. In addition, there was a deterioration of the economy so that regional military commanders had to organize and administer food and other consumer distributing processes, some of which measures were against the laws of the central government.

- b. Political-governmental situation: The elections of 1955 showed that the existing political order was severely challenged. The resulting guided democracy established by President Sukarno made him a virtual dictator. The civil war which followed was led by those desiring an increased measure of regional autonomy for the outlying areas of Indonesia.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

- a. Institutional: The common educational and social background of many of the soldiers and officers on both sides resulted in a noticeable lack of brutality during the hostilities. It also allowed the rebels to negotiate in good faith with delegates of the central army, who were able to reciprocate until their position was undermined by Sukarno.
- b. Personnel: General Nasution's prestige was at a high level after he persuaded insurgents to surrender. Many thought he would use this to increase his own political position, which he refused to do.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

- a. Political: The leaders of the central army reached a

political agreement acceptable to the insurgents. These military leaders were able to persuade the central government to be lenient to those troops who surrendered.

b. Social: The central military leadership carried out a determined policy of avoiding extreme violence, hoping to bring all dissident groups "back to the fold." The military contained an element of multiethnic cohesiveness unique in Indonesia.

c. Economic: Insurgent military commanders acted as regional governors in areas where the economy was disorganized. They administered the distribution of consumer goods when the central government failed to do so and undertook illegal importation of goods.

5. Effects of military roles and activities: The military defeat of the insurgents eliminated any significant opposition to the Sukarno regime. The role played by the central army high command in bringing about a successful conclusion to the civil war with so little repercussion against the rebels raised the level of popular approval of the military establishment. The fact that the military did not use this increased influence to alter the regime helped to solidify President Sukarno's position.
6. Author's conclusions: There seems to be some hidden strength in a regime which is in many ways so incompetent. So far, not even strong military factions have been able to successfully challenge Sukarno's policies of guided democracy.

7. Reviewer's comments: This is an informative analysis of a period in Indonesian history where civil-military relationships still mystify the most competent scholars.

Annotation 9

Author: Khan, Jehangir A.

Title: "The Pakistan Army."

Reference: Asian Review, LV (January 1959), 39-43

Summary

The independence of Pakistan in August 1947 left that country with a poorly-organized military force which had hertofore been integrated with the army of India. The rebuilding of the army included the establishment of military academies and staff schools, in addition to a school of administration. A scientific advisory board was created to coordinate industrial development with the needs of the army.

1. Locus: South Asia.

Tempus: 1959.

Focus: The creation and development of the Pakistani Army.

2. Characteristics of military establishment: At the time of independence, the Pakistani Army lacked almost all the necessary training and educational institutions required to maintain a military establishment. These institutions are now being developed with high standards.
3. Roles of the military establishment.
  - a. Economic: Army personnel serve in an economic advisory capacity as members of scientific advisory councils.

b. Educational: The lack of qualified personnel in the civilian sector has forced the army to establish its own schools.

4. Effects of military roles and activities: The successful expansion of the army has helped to develop a national esprit de corps. It has aided the regime in suppressing antisocial elements, in addition to helping the civilian authorities handle natural and social calamities.
5. Author's conclusions: The Pakistani Army is now a respectable military establishment.
6. Reviewer's comments: These brief comments attempt to justify the role of the army in a military regime whose main problems are solved on a non-rational basis.

Annotation 10

Author: Mackie, J. A. C.

Title: "Indonesia's Government Estates and Their Masters."

Reference: Pacific Affairs, XXXIV (Winter 1961-1962), 337-360.

Summary

Military personnel have taken an active part in the operation of the recently-nationalized plantation estates, which are vital to the economic development and stability of Sumatra and Java. Planning is done largely on a regional basis, sometimes in conflict with the national economic development plans of the central government. Regional autonomy has been encouraged by the failure of the central government to fulfill administrative obligations and has been reinforced by a distaste for Sukarno doctrine by certain military leaders.

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 1961.

Focus: Role of military personnel in economic planning and administration.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: "The transfer of the vital plantation enterprises into state ownership and their control by a new elite of officials could have long term consequences for the ultimate disposition of political power...New vested interests are being created, but because the general power structure of the archipelago has not settled into equilibrium from the upheavals of revolution, rebellion and inflation, it is still not easy to predict how these changes will ultimately affect the country's social and political structure."

b. Political-governmental situation: "In the two confused years following the [plantation] takeover, it looked as if the decisive control over an increasing range of economic life was falling into the hands of regional military authorities ...Djakarta had to leave them wide discretionary powers on problems which were slipping beyond the scope of the central government departments."

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Personnel: As a result of their role as regional planners, advisers, and administrators, many military personnel have become suspicious of the central government and have associated themselves with, if not led, movements for regional autonomy.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

- a. Political: As members of elite groups which plan regional economic and fiscal policies, local military commanders usually possess great political influence in local affairs, "a tendency which could end, at worst, in warlordism, and at best, in establishment of de facto autonomy."
- b. Economic: "The Army's role in economic life seems even more influential because of the large numbers of subordinate officers on the boards controlling Dutch enterprises...., Immediately after the takeovers at the end of 1957, many Army officers were attached to estates as supervisors."

5. Effects of military roles and activities: "The variety of responsibilities taken on by local military commanders has greatly enhanced and encouraged regional autonomy movements. Military behavior has helped to mold a new elite, since as members of the estate operator corporation...they help to form a clearly defined group with distinctive interests."

6. Author's conclusions: "While the role of military personnel has affected a political system characterized by continual tension between national and regional decision-making elites, the power of the Army leaders must be kept in perspective....The central government writ runs effectively in normal circumstances and the integrative forces holding the country together have so far proved stronger than the centrifugal tendencies....In any case, the ultima ratio will still be the Army, which generally has much to lose from disintegrative tendencies and little to gain. The central government has dealt firmly and successfully with embryonic warlords."

7. Reviewer's comments: The author has presented a comprehensible review of a problem unique to Indonesia in which the military has come to play a significant role.

Annotation 11

Author: Park, No Young.

Title: "Should We Impose Democracy on Korea?"

Reference: Current History, XLVII (December 1961), 341-349.

Summary

An analysis of the postwar economic and political trends in South Korea indicates that it is impractical for a truly democratic political system to exist there. The inefficiency of civilian government only benefits the Communists. Therefore, the benefits of a military regime at this time outweigh its deficiencies.

1. Locus: Far East.

Tempus: 1945-1961.

Focus: The South Korean national government.

2. National environment.

- a. Socioeconomic situation: Korea emerged from World War II economically devastated. Its postwar economic reconstruction program was hindered initially by the partition of the country into two states and later by the outbreak of war in 1950.
- b. Political-governmental situation: The postwar political system was fairly democratic, but the demands of a 3-year war initiated a trend which resulted in an authoritarian regime dominated by Syngman Rhee. Social unrest was so high by 1956 that the



military felt it necessary to intervene in order to prevent absolute chaos.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

- a. Institutional: A large army trained and experienced from 3 years of combat had developed a strong sense of loyalty to the military establishment and its commanding officers.
- b. Personnel: Senior military officers, with high prestige as a result of their roles during wartime, had participated in the general corruption of the national administration. At the same time, many officers were disgusted at the inefficiency of the civilian regime. Assured of widespread support, military officers took control of the government in May 1961. A cabinet headed by General Chang Do Young was under the domination of General Pak Chung Hi, who assumed direct control in June of that year. All members of the junta had been senior army officers during the Korean war.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

- a. Political: An army junta has assumed direct control of the national government and has severely restricted civilian political activity throughout the country. Whether they will ever relinquish this power is uncertain.
- b. Economic: The junta, desperately trying to deal with the country's economic plight, initiated a 5-year plan, aimed at increasing the gross national product by 46.3 percent. General austerity measures have been demanded of the public.

5. Effects of military roles and activities: The military government has eliminated much of the corruption that existed before its

rule. Hundreds of government employees have been jailed, political parties have been dissolved; labor-union activities have been suspended; and millionaire businessmen have been arrested. But "it is difficult to predict whether the junta leaders can cure all the ills of Korea."

6. Author's conclusions: U. S. personnel must understand that democracy cannot always function successfully in times of crisis. A totalitarian regime friendly to the United States is better than an unstable democracy which will only aid the Communists.
7. Reviewer's comments: The author has pointed out that civilian democratic government cannot survive in Korea. He does not make it clear whether a military regime can do any better.

#### Annotation 12

Author: Pauker, Guy J.

Title: "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Ed. John J. Johnson.

Reference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

#### Summary

The Armed Forces have played a vital role in bringing about the independence of Indonesia and in shaping the character of that nation's governmental structure. The difference in background and training of the officer corps have served to factionalize elements of the Armed Forces. This has helped President Sukarno maintain his personal power by balancing the competitive pressures brought against him by the Communist Party and the military.

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 1942-1960.

Focus: The political role of the Indonesian Army.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: Indonesia is a fragmented geographical unit containing many different ethnic groups. Its economy had most of the props pulled out from under it by the departing colonial administration. The military institution reflects many of the cultural conflicts.

b. Political-governmental situation: A country emerging into independence reflects problems common to political units containing ethnic and geographical diversities. In a federal state led by a strong president the two strongest political forces, the Indonesian Communist Party and the army, are constantly in a state of tension in relation to each other.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: The composition of the military is characterized by differences in training and temperament of: those troops trained by the Dutch before 1940, those trained by the Japanese during World War II, those with guerrilla experience from 1945-1949, those trained since independence, and those who have received staff training in foreign military schools.

b. Personnel: Officers have generally reflected the struggles of regional autonomy against the central government. Most of the higher officers are strongly anti-Communist and are suspicious of the personal power of Sukarno and of his dealings with the Indonesian Communist Party.

4. Roles of the military establishment.
  - a. Political: Because of its inability to be cohesive enough, the military has not effectively challenged the power of President Sukarno, who uses it as an instrument of repression for political purposes.
  - b. Social: The Armed Forces reflect to some degree the tensions among various ethnic groups in the country and the struggle over central and regional power.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The military is regarded as a significant power factor, but one lacking the capability of independently gaining political control.
6. Author's conclusions: Largely because of background differences, "the officer corps of Indonesia is deeply divided, within the branches of the armed forces, as well as among them, by personal jealousies, conflicting outlooks, and special interests....  
[therefore] instead of carrying out a control function in a yet unstable political system...the officer corps has become an instrument of suppression at the disposal of President Sukarno."
7. Reviewer's comments: This is a good example of one way in which the military has been made subservient to civilian authority.

Annotation 13

Author: Sayeed, Khalid B.

Title: "Martial Law Administration in Pakistan."

Reference: Far Eastern Survey, XXVIII (May 1959), 72-79.

Summary

From the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan has suffered from regional, ethnic, and religious conflict. The politicians had neither

the competence nor the organizational support to deal with these problems. In addition, the civil service lacked the sense of purpose and the solidarity needed to maintain respectable bureaucratic standards. The army has often taken upon itself the responsibility of preventing chaos when civilian authorities could not maintain law and order. The martial law decrees of October 1958 signaled the end of the army's toleration of this situation.

1. Locus: South Asia.

Tempus: 1947-1959.

Focus: The national administrative role of the army in Pakistan.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: Pakistan has suffered from serious ethnic tension within its borders. "The conflict between various groups in Pakistan [involved] a series of fights between a number of groups--Punjabis versus Sindhis, Punjabis versus Pathans, Punjabis versus Bengalis, and West Pakistan versus East Pakistan." The martial law regime has pursued a realistic and orthodox economic policy with emphasis on agricultural rather than industrial production.

b. Political-governmental situation: A military regime has taken over the national government of a nation which was ruled by an incompetent, corrupt coalition of politicians and bureaucrats. The provisions of the martial law decrees have eliminated much of the inefficiency that previously existed. In addition, the military leaders "have often exhorted the Civil Servants to rise to their full stature of competence and technical ability now that the administrative process is no longer hamstrung...."

3. Characteristics of military establishment.
  - a. Institutional: The army, now the ruling force in Pakistan, is a new institution but not a new social or economic class. In this context it is quite different from the military establishments in the Middle East. Its officers come largely from the landowning gentry.
  - b. Personnel: High military officers have important posts in almost all sections of the executive branch of government. By and large, they are a patriotic, efficient group of public servants whose standards are in great contrast to those of civilian bureaucrats and politicians.
4. Roles of the military establishment.
  - a. Political: Under martial law decrees of 1958, political parties were abolished. While some former civilian politicians have been maintained in government positions, most of President Ayub's political advisers are army officers. The regional martial law administrators are military men.
  - b. Social: The military regime, in an attempt to establish a secular base in many aspects of Pakistan life, has done away with any official connection between Islam and the state.
  - c. Economic: The military regime determines policies of economic development, price levels, and land reform.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The martial law regime has made a great impression on the character of the political and economic life of the country. Undisciplined and

inefficient democratic political and judicial institutions have been replaced by efficient military codes.

6. Author's conclusions: President Ayub is beginning to formulate provisions under which the ruling group can be broadened. Although he has succeeded in eliminating much of the cause of ineffectiveness which existed previously, it is difficult to tell when constitutional government can be restored. He is anxious to have the support of the urban middle class, but this is the group which opposes many of the ruling patterns which he has instituted.
7. Reviewer's comments: The martial law regime is portrayed as a necessity for Pakistan at this time. Even if this is so, the author fails to suggest what type of governing process will be necessary for the future.

Annotation 14

Author: Trager, Frank N.

Title: "The Failure of U Nu and the Return of the Armed Forces in Burma."

Reference: The Review of Politics, XXV (July 1963), 309-328.

Summary

The military coup of March 1962 was the result of growing dissention between military leaders and Premier U Nu on how to deal with the grave social and political problems facing Burma. The factionalism within the Union Party, the Communist insurgency threat, and the regional demands of various ethnic groups were causing deterioration of the nation in the opinion of high military officers. The Revolutionary Council has abolished most democratic institutions, and the military remains the most cohesive and disciplined Burmese institution.

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 1962.

Focus: Reasons for military takeover of the national government.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: Although the value of the gross national product was rising, the ethnic disunity and the tension over the question of a state religion sharply divided the nation. Premier U Nu was held responsible by many for the chaotic political situation, which he was evidently not able to control.

b. Political-governmental situation: U Nu had been constitutionally reelected to the premiership of the country, but was unable to carry out the policies which he declared to be in the national interest. The military Revolutionary Council that deposed him in March 1962 dissolved both chambers of parliament and replaced state councils with military officials.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: The cohesiveness of the armed forces has enabled it to contribute to the development of Burmese nationalism. However, it contains much of the personal factionalism present in all aspects of organized Burmese life.

b. Personnel: While various senior officers are vying with each other for increased influence, General Ne Win is able to maintain firmly the dominant position.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

a. Political: Although terminating the process of parliamentary



democracy, the military regime has allowed existing political parties to maintain themselves. The armed forces have also asked acceptance of a newly formed All-Burma Socialist Program Party.

b. Economic: Although tolerating private business, the military government has assumed control over the Burma Economic Development Corporation, which directs 40 or 50 business firms. It has set up regional councils to direct agricultural improvement programs.

5. Effects of military roles and activities: "The coup d'etat of March 2, 1962, was a decisive step by one of the important sectors of Burmese nationalist and patriotic life to preserve the union. They, the armed forces, though not only they, had demonstrated their loyalty throughout independence to this essential ideal."
6. Author's conclusions: Observers of Burmese political, social, and economic life must sympathize with their desire to have "unity, order, socialism, and democracy--in that order." The Burmese military establishment can contribute to this orderly transitional process, perhaps better than any other institution.
7. Reviewer's comments: This is one of a series of informative discussions by this author on political events in Burma.

Annotation 15

Author: Trager, Frank N.

Title: "The Political Split in Burma."

Reference: Far Eastern Survey, XXVII (October 1958). 145-155.

### Summary

U Nu's voluntary step of turning the presidency over to General Ne Win was a result of the growing split within the leadership of Burma's strongest political force, the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League. The army, though claiming neutrality in this political struggle, has been seriously concerned over the fact that many Communists, who have been sympathizing with the guerrillas which the military has been fighting for several years, are carrying out campaigns to discredit the army.

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 1956-1958.

Focus: Causes of the change of government in Burma.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: A nation with diverse and sometimes fiercely antagonistic ethnic groups has made favorable progress toward continued economic development.

b. Political-governmental situation: The political atmosphere into which the military entered "is a result of personal and organizational rivalries rather than one based on political programs." The government party (the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League) had been the leading force of resistance against the Japanese and later against Great Britain, but over the years had become a hopelessly factionalized political organization.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: The army looked upon itself as the leader of Burmese nationalism both during and after the war. It had

- carried out respectable campaigns against regional and Communist insurgent groups, but felt that Communist politicians were continually undermining its efforts to preserve the nation.
- b. Personnel: The leaders of the armed forces "are the best guarantee against a Communist coup in Burma. General Ne Win and his top officer group have built solidly and patriotically."
4. Roles of the military establishment.
- a. Political: The army, technically considering itself a "neutral" force, was voluntarily requested by a constitutionally legal step to supervise the national political scene. The subsequent appointments to the military regime's cabinet reflect an impartial attitude toward political factions.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The participation of senior military officials in the national government in a non-violent political atmosphere has served to stimulate a broadened interest in politics by a variety of social groups who had heretofore abstained from politics. In addition, the civil service has gained a measure of self-respect, realizing that "governments may come and go, but their work goes on."
6. Author's conclusions: The outcome of this transfer of national political leadership "is bound to have profound effects on Burma's leadership and political institutions during the second decade of her independence."
7. Reviewer's comments: This is a highly informative analysis of events for those interested in subsequent trends of Burmese political patterns.

Annotation 16

Author: van der Kroef, Justus M.

Title: "Disunited Indonesia."

Reference: Far Eastern Survey XXVII (April 1958), 49-62.

Title: "Disunited Indonesia II."

Reference: Far Eastern Survey, XXVII (May 1958), 73-80.

Summary

The worsening economic situation, the influence of Communist elements, and the question of regional autonomy had divided the Indonesian political and military elite for several years before the outbreak of civil war early in 1958. The growing antagonism of certain military commanders toward the central government in Djakarta had resulted in their carrying out a number of political and administrative policies independent of central authority. Attempts by Sukarno and his senior military advisers to suppress this independence led to open rebellion.

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 1956-1958.

Focus: Civil war in Indonesia.

2. National environment.

- a. Socioeconomic situation: There has been a growing resistance by the population of Sumatra and other provinces to the domination of national politics by Javanese. The inability of the national government to establish a healthy foundation for economic development resulted in a situation in which the lack of consumer goods and means of distribution led to inflation and even starvation.

- b. Political-governmental situation: A guided democracy has all but abolished federal and parliamentary institutions. The unitary political system that has been put into effect has aroused much antagonism on the part of regional military commanders, who are disturbed by the inability of the central government to effectively administer the nation.
- 3. Characteristics of military establishment.
  - a. Personnel: The military elite is divided in its support of the Sukarno regime. Some army commanders have openly collaborated with separatist groups, disobeying orders from their superior officers. Members of the senior staff are supporting the president, eager to carry out combat against the insurgent groups in order to "teach them a lesson."
- 4. Roles of the military establishment.
  - a. Political: Regional military commanders have, in effect, become governors of areas in which their troops are stationed. Many are supervising barter trade agreements with outside firms independent of government channels. Many military commanders are fully cooperating with the insurgent government.
  - b. Economic: Army commanders in Sumatra have taken it upon themselves to see that their troops and the population are provided with food and clothing, often defying government policy to do so.
- 5. Effects of military roles and activities: The separatist movement, of which many officers and troop units were a part, resulted

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 1945-1959.

Focus: The autonomous behavior of certain military leaders.

2. National environment.

- a. Socioeconomic situation: Military leadership, feeling frustrated and alienated from the main currents of politics, took on certain characteristics of a quasi-independent institution with the ability to sustain itself regardless of tension with the central government.
- b. Political-governmental situation: The lack of definite control by the central government over many outlying areas of Indonesia allowed regional military commanders to carry out political and economic policies beyond their intended role.

3. Characteristics of military establishments.

- a. Institutional: At the time of independence, the army was a rather ill-disciplined, poorly organized force. A major problem was integrating the many types of armed groups (that is, those trained by the Dutch, those trained by the Japanese, those who were guerrilla fighters, and other independent armed bands).
- b. Personnel: The high degree of independent behavior on the part of many senior military officers has resulted in continual intrigue and manipulation, involving arrest, exile, and civil war.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

- a. Political: The military, by veto and boycott, has been able to influence the character and degree of control of the

central government over national affairs.

- b. Social: The autonomy of many of the armed forces units in areas apart from central government control has placed army leaders in a position of benevolent paternalism in relation to the indigenous inhabitants.
  - c. Economic: Certain army units have been forced to provide for themselves and for civilians in their region. Army units have been involved in the smuggling of goods and funds which they needed.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The central government has been constantly embarrassed by the fact that it can neither provide for nor control the national armed forces.
6. Author's conclusions: A serious explosion has not taken place in Indonesia between the civilian and military elites only because of a "remarkable ability in avoiding head on collisions of hostile political forces."
7. Reviewer's comments: This is an informative review of the unique nature of civil-military relations which exist in Indonesia today.

Annotation 13

Author: Wilson, David A.

Title: Politics in Thailand.

Reference: Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962.

Summary

The military is a focal point in the analysis of the structure of power in Thailand. Army officers have dominated the ruling elite since the

1932 coup. There are historical and organizational reasons for this; central to it is the legitimate politicizing of the professional officer corps.

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 1932 to present.

Focus: The armed forces as one of the functional bureaucracies in Thailand.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: The military is a traditional ruling elite, distinctive in form but not in function.

b. Political-governmental situation: The army has been able to maintain control over government organization by its ability to determine which officials, civilian or military, will have key administrative assignments.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: The Thai Army traces its development into a professional organization from the training programs given by British military missions after the turn of the century. Its political characteristics result from its continuing functional cohesion with the civilian elite.

b. Personnel: Military commanders were traditionally members of the royal elite. After the overthrow of the monarchy in 1932, military officers continued to regard themselves as legitimate interpreters of political trends.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

a. Political: The military has had an increasingly important political role since 1932. This is largely because civilian



groups are unable to articulate their political functions without the overt support of armed forces leaders.

- b. Social: Because the Thai people understand social organization when it is patterned in subordinate-superordinate terms, the organization of the military hierarchy fits the traditional modes of Thai social norms.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The military has been successful in maintaining a dominant role in Thai national affairs by incorporating traditional social norms with modern bureaucratic requirements and making them institutional monopolies of the Thai armed forces. This has resulted in an administrative autonomy which the civilians are unable to challenge.
6. Author's conclusions: The military will be the dominant force in Thai politics until a civilian group is able to mold a national consciousness and sense of national purpose equal to that of the armed forces. This is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future.
7. Reviewer's comments: This is an excellent analysis of a country and a military establishment which have been sorely neglected by Western scholars.

Annotation 19

Author: Wilson, David A.

Title: "The Military in Thai Politics" The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Ed. John J. Johnson,

Reference: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

### Summary

The army in Thailand is deeply involved in the process of distributing the rewards of goods, prestige, and power within the ruling elite.

Traditionally, it was allied with civilian groups seeking the overthrow of the monarchy. Since 1932, certain institutional characteristics have distinguished the military from the civilians. However, military and civilian political groups have similar origins, and differences are sometimes superficial.

1. Locus: Southeast Asia.

Tempus: 20th century.

Focus: The military as a power force.

2. National environment

- a. Socioeconomic situation: In Thailand, the nation's wealth has been distributed only among the elite. The masses accept military participation in politics as legitimate and have taken little initiative to change the power structure.

- b. Political-governmental situation: In the unstable political situation, the army has a dominant influence at all times, whether military men hold actual positions of power or merely influence decisions and policy behind the scenes.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

- a. Institutional: The image of the military establishment is that of a disciplined, well-trained force. However, when playing the role of bureaucrat and administrator, it shows similar characteristics to civilian institutions. Influential military officers have as much competition from other

military personnel as they do from civilian politicians.

- b. Personnel: A military career is looked upon by many as a step in the process of gaining political prominence. In order to have a chance of success, all politicians are aware that they must not lose contact with armed forces support.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

- a. Political: An important element of the ruling elite, the military were stimulated first by the Japanese during World War II and later by the demands for dramatic modernization.
- b. Social: The military does not disturb the traditional social order; it tends rather to reinforce Thai concepts of hierarchical subordination.
- c. Economic: "The Ministry of Defense...directs several industrial enterprises, including a fuel distribution organization and factories producing batteries, leather goods, glass, woven cloth, and canned food." In addition, it operates banks and radio stations.
- d. Educational: The Ministry of Defense has a free hand in making the curriculum at the military academies, and these academies determine for themselves who will be admitted.

5. Effects of military roles and activities: The great autonomy of the military establishment and the absence of war has allowed the army to develop institutions and processes which have not disrupted the traditional social, political, and economic systems of Thailand. Instead, it seems to have paralleled civilian institutions, thus taking on many of their characteristics.

Independent traits of the military are a sense of duty to one's superior, a sense of honor for the military institution, and a sense of loyalty to the nation. Officers tend to believe that "what is good for the army is good for the country."

6. Author's conclusions: "...the army is confronted with the tensions that pervade the Thai political system: an authoritarian tendency, at once welcomed but illegitimate and irregular.... Its legitimacy is open to challenge from any group which dares. To give the appearance of some legitimacy the army has made a show of adherence to constitutionalism, and in doing this has repeatedly created problems for itself."
7. Reviewer's comments: This is an excellent discussion giving an example of a military establishment which incorporates many of the characteristics of a modern institution, yet resists the forces of social change, broader political participation, and economic development.

#### Essays

##### Annotation 20

Author: Chatterjee, B. J.

Title: "The Role of the Armed Forces in Southeast Asia."

Reference: International Studies, II (January 1961), 221-233.

#### Summary

The role of armed units as guerrillas during the war and as revolutionary insurgents after the war placed military leaders in a position to greatly influence national politics after independence. An analysis of the military

establishments in Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma indicates the political relationship of each army with civilian power groups.

1. Theme/theory: The military institutions have significant political roles in Southeast Asian countries for two reasons: (1) their extreme patriotism, emerging from their combat experience against the Japanese, and (2) the inability of civilian political groups to maintain national security.
2. Rationale/evidence: Although the army in Indonesia merely has a restraining power on national political trends, it participates actively in economic development and education. In Burma, the army took charge of the national executive at the request of a civilian ruler who was unable to solve worsening national crises. The armed forces in Thailand overthrew the monarchy in 1932 in order to achieve national unity and has remained the only real political force.
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: The role of the military has eliminated prospects for emergence of democratic governments in any of these countries.
4. Reviewer's comments: This is too brief an analysis of a complex situation. Although the discussions on Indonesia, Burma, and Thailand offer the reader some indication of the thoughts of indigenous military and civilian leaders, the brief comments on North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Malaya, and Laos are of little analytical use.

Annotation 21

Author: Darling, Frank C.

Title: "Modern Politics in Thailand".

Reference: The Review of Politics, XXIV (April 1962), 163-182.

Summary

The overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932 did not end authoritarian rule in Thailand. Within 35 years, attempts to establish a representative form of government resulted in seven major coups d'etat. In 1957, all democratic pretenses were abolished by Marshal Sarit Thanarat, and any hope of political reform is quite remote.

1. Theme/theory: Although certain aspects of Western parliamentary democracy are alien to Thai political development, military rule can be constructive in a transitional society demanding strong leadership.
2. Rationale/evidence: The political philosophy expounded by the present military regime is not too different from that proclaimed by absolute monarchists of the 19th century. "To the members of the Sarit government democracy is actually a benevolent rule influenced by the ideals of Buddhism and the paternalism of the ancient Thai kings. It is not a limited form of government nor does it involve the participation of the Thai people in the policy-making process." The military regime has taken strong measures to promote industry and agriculture. Better education and sanitation practices are also being encouraged by the military regime.
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: Although the military government has contributed to the development of the Thai economy, Marshal Sarit has ignored advice by friendly

nations to institute reform programs which would broaden the base of political participation. The international situation in Southeast Asia and the determination of the United States to keep Thailand in the Western camp give opposition political forces little chance to participate in national policy making.

4. Reviewer's comments: The author gives a good example of the type of frustration experienced by Asian states. Although eager to incorporate many of the technical innovations of the West, they are unable to develop social and political institutions which can implement the necessary requirements of a healthy nation-building process.

#### Annotation 22

Author: Pauker, Guy J.

Title: "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade."

Reference: World Politics, XI (April 1959), 325-345.

#### Summary

The military officer corps is the only institution in Southeast Asia with the organizational strength to withstand the determined drive by the Communists to dominate the region. However, officer corps in Southeast Asia are largely closed groups that have not dealt with the problems of broadening the impact of their skills and patriotism. If they learn to understand that their role as political leaders must be a transitional one, "they could set the stage for future development in a democratic direction."

1. Theme/theory: Representative government has failed in Southeast Asia, and if stable institutions are not given powers to influence national programs and policies, the resulting power vacuum will

allow the Communists to dominate the area within the decade. It is the military officer corps which "face the choice of taking over their countries or letting the Communists fill the vacuum."

2. Rationale/evidence: Everywhere in Southeast Asia attempts to revive and maintain the earlier nationalist fervor through efficient government and administration have failed. The history of postwar Laos, Burma, South Vietnam, and Indonesia clearly show this. In quality, skills, patriotism, and standards of moral values, the officers corps includes "some of the new countries' best human material."
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: It is in the interest of the United States and the Free World to support institutions in Southeast Asia which have organizational strength. It is imperative that full advantage be taken of this last chance to keep Southeast Asia out of the Communist bloc by giving constructive aid to the military.
4. Reviewer's comments: The author's lack of optimism in the constructive value of civilian institutions in this area has proven to be well-founded. His enthusiasm for the officer corps may be somewhat altered by events in the early 1960's.

#### LATIN AMERICA

#### Case Studies

Annotation 23

Author: Alexander, Robert J.

Title: The Peron Era.

Reference: New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.



### Summary

The role of Juan Peron during the grave political upheavals which took place in Argentina from 1943 to 1946 explains his election as president soon after World War II. The author analyzes the techniques of Peron's rule within the framework of support given him by organized labor, the Catholic Church, and the Armed Forces.

Military personnel provided the base of his support during the early years of his political activity, and this same group continued to play an important role after he became head of state. Peron's own background as an army officer led him to believe that soldiers had certain advantages over civilians in governing a nation. "Government is a struggle" he stated, "and struggles—be they military or economic—are governed by the same principles. We are better qualified than any other group to win such a struggle. . . The rest may have intelligence, but the spirit of the struggle is more highly developed in the soldier than in members of any other profession."

Military men participated to a significant degree in the economic life of the country. As part of the modernizing effort, military officers often managed the factories which produced their equipment, directed transportation and communications facilities, and influenced the politicians who drew up their budget.

The political factionalism within the ranks of the various services was possibly encouraged by Peron himself. Hints of possible dissatisfaction with Peron by the military led the author to believe that direct military intervention was a continuing possibility.

### Reviewer's Comments

The author has done an adequate job of explaining the nature of "Peronismo." It is unfortunate for those primarily interested in the role of the military that this book was not written 4 years later. Events

following the publication of this book have proved the reliability of the author's observations and insights.

Annotation 24

Author: Baratz, Morton S.

Title: "The Crisis in Brazil."

Reference: Social Research, XXII (Autumn 1955), 347-361.

Summary

The suicide of President Getulio Vargas in August 1954 reflected the grave political and economic situation in which Brazil found itself. The political stresses were a logical outgrowth of prevailing conditions of inflation, unbalanced growth, administrative corruption, and lack of national consensus. In a situation where the divisions of the various interest groups are deep, the military has looked upon itself as the force protecting the constitutional government.

1. Locus: South America.

Tempus: 1954-1955.

Focus: The role of the military in a politically  
unstable environment.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: The drive for industrialization has been hampered by the necessity of relying on the export of coffee. Imports have largely been in the industrial sector, and the resulting increase of manufacturing has caused a rise in the urban population. This, in turn, has increased the demand for consumer goods, causing an inflationary spiral.

- b. Political-governmental situation: "Confronted with a number of fundamental policy problems, the nation has no instrumentality through which a consistent set of national goals can be formulated. There are no national parties; there are only fragmented groups.... Thus there is no means at hand for arriving at a national consensus on the fundamental issues of policy."
3. Characteristics of military establishment.
- a. Institutional: Although possessing no definitive political position, "the sympathy of the generals leans toward a national policy which is cautiously pro-foreign and free-enterprise, a position held by the business and commercial interests."
4. Roles of the military establishment.
- a. Political: The military, as the most potent single political force, has delegated to itself the responsibility of protecting the constitutional process.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The Armed Forces has suffered some internal strain in its determination to act as a moderating force and refrains from taking direct governmental control. The army and air force, not necessarily in unity, became restive during the events after Vargas' death.. The probability of direct military intervention had never before been so high.
6. Author's conclusions: The prospects for economic and political stability are uncertain. The mood of the Armed Forces at any given time greatly influences national events.

7. Reviewer's comments: While the role of the military is not the only focal point of this discussion, the implied potential power of the Armed Forces in politics is of unique value in analyzing social processes in Brazil.

Annotation 25

Author: Fluharty, Vernon Lee.

Title: Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia.

Reference: Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957.

Summary

After a survey of the political events which preceded the takeover of General Rojas Pinilla, the author suggests that Pinilla's rise to power was stimulated by the political vacuum brought about by the chaos of 5 years of civil war. By the summer of 1953 the political nerves of the country had reached a point where only the army could arbitrate differences between the Liberal and Conservative parties. "Gomez' dictatorship had been abated by the only competent force left in the nation. The Liberals had destroyed themselves over reform questions. The victorious Conservatives had bickered and snarled over the spoils of victory. In a morass created by the failure of the traditional parties to lead and point the way, the nation wallowed in its own blood, and there was no public force capable of rescuing it save the military."

In an analysis of the economic and social problems faced by the General, Pinilla is portrayed not as a leader of an old-fashioned palace coup, but a man called to leadership in a time of total revolution. He is characterized as a man who did not use his military power for personal

glory or in the interests of the upper elite, but as a patriot who ruled "in order to secure greater economic democracy for the future."

Reviewer's Comments

Anyone using broad economic, social, and political factors as a basis for justifying a virtual one-man dictatorship runs the risk of being disproven by subsequent events. The late author would have a difficult time defending his thesis that Rojas Pinilla was laying the foundations of a democratic system in Colombia. There is adequate evidence to indicate that Pinilla was well aware of the means of violence at his disposal and that he used his military prestige to step into a political situation which was open to a dramatic solution.

Annotation 26

Author: Gollan, Jose Santos.

Title: "Argentine Interregnum."

Reference: Foreign Affairs, XXXV (October 1956), 84-94.

Summary

The speed with which Juan Peron was overthrown indicated the shallowness of his regime. All illusions about the sophisticated political system which he was alleged to control were dispelled by his quick flight when challenged by the Armed Forces. The junta led by General Lonardi was unable to consolidate the mass political support as its successor did. The military junta headed by General Aramburu is sincerely laying the groundwork which will allow popular elections to take place peacefully in the near future.

1. Locus: Latin America.

Tempus: 1955-1956.

Focus: The military juntas following the overthrow of Juan Peron.

2. National environment.

- a. Socioeconomic situation: A dictatorial regime which was supposed to have widespread support in the ranks of organized labor and the Armed Forces did not receive the support of these groups when ousted by a military coup. The military juntas now in power are making desperate efforts to gain mass support.
- b. Political-governmental situation: The dictatorship of Juan Peron was overthrown by a temporary alliance of a wide range of political and military groups. Once in power, deep-seated differences came into the open. The inability of one junta to achieve any degree of national consensus led to its replacement by another military group.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

- a. Institutional: The military establishment cannot be looked upon as a monolithic group. Navy officers supported the junta led by General Lonardi, and army officers (some of whom had recently returned from political exile) were behind the second coup--3 months later--which installed General Aramburu in power.
- b. Personnel: Armed forces personnel have become a dominant factor in the Argentine political system. They are associated with both moderate and extreme political factions.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

- a. Political: The military determines the political system of the interregnum. Although members of political parties are consulted on many policies, it is the military which makes all final decisions.

- b. Economic: The military regime has publicized the economic plight of the country. The military junta is determined to guide the re-establishment of institutions which will increase and modernize industry, agriculture, and transportation.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The military junta has attempted to "eliminate all vestiges of totalitarianism in order to restore morality, justice, law, freedom and democracy." The regime insists that it is merely a provisional government and "its members have no intention of remaining in power."
6. Author's conclusions: The interregnum government will not be in power long enough to solve all of Argentina's economic and social problems, but it is formulating a political process which will stimulate the development of political democracy.
7. Reviewer's comments: The author's hope that the military was intervening in politics only temporarily was never realized.

Annotation 27

Author: Helguera, J. Leon.

Title: "The Changing Role of the Military in Colombia."

Reference: Journal of Inter-American Studies, III (July 1961), 351-357.

Summary

The condition of the Armed Forces in the 19th century reflected the general chaotic situation of Colombia. The army was an untrained and inefficient force used as a pawn by the political elites; literacy rates and pay scales remained low until the 1920's. World War II brought the military into the political arena as a distinct force. After an attempted coup in 1944, the military played a vital role in the course of events bringing an end to the civil war in 1953, but even the military dictator

Rojas Pinilla was unable to bring about social or economic stability. Deep splits between political groups encourage military intervention into politics.

1. Locus: Latin America.

Tempus: 19th and 20th centuries.

Focus: The Colombian Army.

2. National environment.

- a. Socioeconomic situation: Economic instability increased during the 1930's and reached drastic proportions during the isolation of the Colombian economy during World War II. The military came to power after 5 years of civil war in 1953, but the depression of 1955 indicated that they were no more able than civilian administrators to stabilize the nation's faltering economy.
- b. Political-governmental situation: Unable to work out any system in which rule was by consensus, the civilian political elite defaulted to the military after the civil war of 1948-1953. Rojas Pinilla thought of himself as a third force stepping into a political vacuum. Although Colombia has returned to civilian rule, the future role of the military will be determined by the ability of the various political groups to compromise in the interests of stability.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

- a. Institutional: Ill-trained and undisciplined, the army was not aware of itself as a distinct force in politics until World War II. However by 1950, it saw itself as the only force capable of ruling Colombia effectively.



- b. Personnel: During World War II, individual officers began to perceive political roles which they could play. The abortive coup of 1944 indicated a trend which was highlighted by the installation of Rojas Pinilla as president in 1953.
- 4. Roles of the military establishment.
  - a. Political: Civilian dominance of the Armed Forces continued throughout the 19th century. The changing role of the military was indicated by the increased participation of military personnel in politics after World War II.
  - b. Social: A limited civic action program was instituted by the military during the second decade of the 20th century.
  - c. Educational: Illiterate army recruits have been receiving elementary education since 1912.
- 5. Effects of military roles and activities; The military must now be considered a serious political force in Colombia. However, during the period of military rule, the army was unable to bring about any drastic changes in the basic factors which caused widespread poverty and depression.
- 6. Author's conclusions: The changing role of the military in Colombia is reflected in the trend of the army toward becoming an independent power factor.
- 7. Reviewer's comments: This brief historical survey introduces the reader to trends of civil-military relations in Colombia, but it omits any comparative analysis.

Annotation 28

Author: Needler, Martin.

Title: "Peru Since the Coup."

Reference: The World Today, XIV (February 1963), 77-84

Summary

The background of military intervention after national elections in Peru during the summer of 1962 is reviewed.

1. Locus: Latin America.  
Tempus: 1962.  
Focus: Aftermath of elections held on 8 June 1962.
2. National environment.
  - a. Political-governmental situation: Haya de la Torre, leader of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, had a long history of opposing military participation in Peruvian politics. When he and his party received a plurality in the election, the opposing candidate, Belaude Terry, urged the military to nullify the election results.
3. Characteristics of military establishment.
  - a. Institutional: The Peruvian electoral law provides that the Armed Forces are to supervise national elections. This becomes the justification for military intervention in the election process.
  - b. Personnel: A junta led by General Ricardo Perez Goday took charge of the national government after the election results were declared void.
4. Roles of the military establishment.
  - a. Political: The army, fearing either political chaos or the election of the wrong candidate, dominated the political

scene in Peru when its leaders felt their interests were threatened.

5. Effects of military roles and activities: A national election was canceled, and the military clearly showed its ability to limit the activity of civilian political institutions.
6. Author's conclusions: The military intervened with little evidence to support their charge that fraud had taken place in the national election. Although the military promised new elections, they did not take place immediately.
7. Reviewer's comments: This is an informative discussion of one set of circumstances under which the military influenced the politics of a Latin American country.

Annotation 29

Author: Potash, Robert A.

Title: "The Changing Role of the Military in Argentina."

Reference: Journal of Inter-American Studies, III (October 1961), 571-577.

Summary

The Argentine military played its first significant political role in 1930, when an anti-liberal group of officers overthrew President Irigoyen. Since that time, it has intervened directly in 1943 and 1955. Although the scope and intensity have varied, at no time has the military ceased to be a political force. Once military factions assume political leadership, interservice rivalry is further complicated by ideological differences. Thus there is no guarantee that the military will be a stabilizing influence in a chaotic political situation.

1. Locus: Latin America.

Tempus: 1930-1961.

Focus: The political role of high-ranking officers in the  
Armed Forces.

2 National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: Officer classes in all three  
branches of the Argentine Armed Forces have attempted to  
promote the prestige of their services while participating  
in ideological struggles. This results in a complex  
situation in which military intervention does not  
necessarily mean an increase in political stability

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: The officer corps of the armed services  
has a self-appointed role as a balancer in the political  
system.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

a. Political: Although the relationship of the military to  
civilian political groups may change (that is, the military  
collaborates sometimes with leftist, sometimes with  
rightist, groups or acts independently), the Armed Forces  
always have a significant amount of control over executive  
responsibilities.

5. Effects of military roles and activities: The military  
personnel who intervene in politics tend to behave like the  
civilian politicians. This problem was understood by  
several officers after the 1955 revolt, who, committing

themselves to a policy of defending the Argentine constitution, were successful in assuring public elections.

6. Author's conclusions: Any superficial ideas that military rule may be more effective than civilian must be substantiated by serious analysis of each situation. This has not been the case in Argentina in the last 35 years, and the future holds no promise that the military will always abstain from direct rule. If they do rule, military leaders will have attitudes and policies different from civilians..

7. Reviewer's Comments: The author's conclusions are well founded.

Annotation 30

Author: Prewett, Virginia.

Title: "The Mexican Army."

Reference: Foreign Affairs, XXIX (April 1941), 609-620.

Summary

In the years since the Mexican revolution, the army has evolved from an institution whose loyalties were to local commanders to one whose loyalties are directed toward the national government. Changing from an agent of national instability into one of the significant agents of economic development, the Mexican Armed Forces will be able to contribute to hemisphere defense should World War II expand to American shores.

1. Locus: Latin America.

Tempus: 1910-1941.

Focus: The changing character of the Mexican Armed Forces.

2. National environment.

- a. Political-governmental situation: The national government had the support of an apolitical army.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

- a. Institutional: The Armed Forces considers itself to be the defender of constitutional government in Mexico, and not the agent of partisan forces. "That this evolution is gradually changing the psychology of the Army is shown by the fact that in each successive military rebellion since de la Huerta's in 1923, fewer and fewer Army elements have taken part. It is, however, true that the rapid and arbitrary promotions made in the revolutionary years have left a large number of men in the higher ranks who are still as much politicians as soldiers."

4. Roles of the military establishment.

- a. Political: The army is a permanent, nonpolitical institution. Evolution away from the old idea of the army as a means for advancing the political fortunes of its leaders has been assiduously fostered by the government. The government has mobilized military support for the one legal party, thus integrating army aspirations with a national effort.
- b. Economic: "During the past few years the accent of the army has been on...civic projects.... Roads have been built and kept in repair, drainage and irrigation projects have been completed, reforestation undertaken.... The army has built schools, hospitals and airports, and aids in enforcing agrarian laws."
- c. Educational: Education has been a prime factor in the evolution of the military into an apolitical institution.

Staff schools and colleges are available for all ranks of officers. It has been made clear that promotion depends on education and technical skills.

5. Effects of military roles and activities: Mexico has managed to create an effective line army by "giving officers instruction in military science and in orthodox methods of organization and discipline. Along with this has gone the inculcation of the idea that the army is a servant rather than the creator of the government."
6. Author's conclusions: The non-combat activities of military personnel have reduced potential combat efficiency, "which after all is the primary quality needed by a body whose chief purpose is national defense."
7. Reviewer's comments: Since the combat efficiency of the Mexican Army was never tested in World War II, perhaps the evolution of the military into an institution under civilian control is even more important than the author suggests.

Annotation 31

Author: Tannenbaum, Frank.

Title: "Personal Government in Mexico," Evolution of Latin American Government. Ed. Asher N. Christensen.

Reference: New York: Henry Holt, 1951.

Summary

As part of an analysis of the power structure in Mexico (where the president holds dominant power), the author points to the military as one of the bases of that power structure. Although sometimes challenged by

labor and agrarian organizations, the army is still the government's chief source of support. The president can control the careers of government officials, including military officers. The importance of this cannot be exaggerated, especially since the president can separate officers from the means of violence and thus eliminate opposition.

1. Locus: Latin America.

Tempus: 1910-1951.

Focus: Governmental power structure of Mexico.

2. National environment.

a. Political-governmental situation: The military, along with labor and agrarian institutions, has been integrated into an elite and bureaucratic structure in which little or no opposition to the presidency is allowed.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Personnel: Since the president requires the support of the army for survival, he tends to insure that the military units are commanded by officers loyal to his regime. By ascertaining who has been promoted and who has been shifted from one post to another, one can determine the military supporters of the president and understand the executive's techniques of assuring military support.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

a. Political: An interdependent relationship exists between the army and the presidency. The executive needs military support for political survival, but the individual officer can no longer be an independent political force.



5. Effects of military roles and activities: The governmental power structure is so formulated as to eliminate the military establishment, or any one army officer, as a potential threat to the presidency.
6. Author's conclusions: "The individual general can no longer impose himself upon the nation because he has a group of friends who will follow him in battle. But as long as the central government has to use the Army for its own political purposes in controlling the federal states, the Army is bound to possess great political influence, and no man could come to the office of the presidency against its will."
7. Reviewer's comments: This brief analysis is excellent supplementary reading to Edwin Lieuwen's chapter on Mexico in Arms and Politics in Latin America. New York: Praeger, 1960.  
(See Annotation 39.)

Annotation 32

Author: Whitaker, Arthur P.

Title: "Left and Right Extremism in Argentina."

Reference: Current History, XLIV (February 1963), 84-88.

Summary

The political crisis following the Argentine elections of March 1962 indicated the inability of President Arturo Frondizi to balance the forces of Peronista labor with the power of the military. The compromise worked out by a liberal military ruling group after replacing a more extremist junta was greeted by the populace with relief if not enthusiasm.

1. Locus: Latin America.

Tempus: 1962.

Focus: Military political intervention in Argentina.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: A nation with many economic resources and a homogeneous skilled population, Argentina has never been able to exploit its assets. This situation reflects the political immaturity of the country's elite groups.

b. Political-governmental situation: After the national elections of March 1962 showed significant gains by Peronista candidates, the military demanded the annulment of several provincial elections. This was followed by demands from the armed forces that the president resign. When he failed to do so, he was ousted by a conservative junta, which was itself replaced several months later.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: The military cannot be regarded as a monolithic unit. "They are divided by inter-service rivalries, by rivalries (often of a personal kind) within each service, and by differences in political and social sympathies."

4. Roles of the military establishment.

a. Political: The armed forces leaders showed their ability to nullify any political occurrences of which they did not approve. However, military rulers reflected the same fragmentation characteristics as the civilian political elite.

- b. Social: The hostility of organized labor to the Armed Forces has been increased by alienation of the followers of Juan Peron.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The domination of the political scene by the military reflects the failure of the fairly prosperous middle class to fill the political vacuum created by the decline of the traditional oligarchy. The unstable political situation, which even the military has not been able to stabilize, further aggravates Argentina's grave economic problems.
6. Author's conclusions: The military will continue to be the significant factor in Argentine politics because the public accepts its rule rather than risk a more extreme type of government.
7. Reviewer's comments: Although brief, this article serves to introduce those unfamiliar with Argentina to the great complexities of that nation's political process.

#### Essays

#### Annotation 33

Author: Alexander, Robert J.

Title: "The Army in Politics," Government and Politics in Latin America.  
Ed. Harold E. Davis.

Reference: New York: Ronald Press, 1958.

#### Summary

The lack of any real distinction between civilian and military power in Spanish-American colonial administration served as a basis for the participation of the Armed Forces in domestic politics from the time of independence to the present. Three basic techniques of military intervention

have been coups d'etat, military factions siding with civilian political groups, and open civil war. Once in control of the political power structure, the military has ruled directly or indirectly, having great influence on the changing social structure and the spirit of nationalism and revolution.

1. Locus: Latin America..

Tempus: 20th century..

Focus: The impact of the Armed Forces in Latin American politics.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: The ruling elite has slowly changed from one in which the landed aristocracy, the traditional officer corps, and the church made up the ruling group to one in which the rising urban middle class has given many of the younger officers an awareness of the impact of social change.

b. Political-governmental situation: The military often reflects the political changes which have been taking place since the end of World War I, and these changes have served to strengthen the civilian groups which now challenge military intervention in politics. The trade unions in particular are seriously competing with the military in the political arena.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: An ill-equipped force with the facade of an elite group, the army is characterized by much pomp acquired through illicit financial dealings. Engaging in political activities has become a habit and a tradition accepted by all members of the upper class.

- b. Personnel: Modernization of the Armed Forces has stimulated antagonisms between the officers of the three services. In recent years there has also been a significant cleavage between the younger and older officers.
- 4. Roles of the military establishment.
  - a. Political: It is traditional for the military to intervene in politics. Although its control over the means of violence has increased, it is no longer able to take any political action without being met with resistance from civilian pressure groups.
  - b. Social: The military is an increasingly influential agency of social mobilization. The difference in the temperament of officers from one generation to another is easy to perceive.
  - c. Technical: The skills of army officers have helped them acquire management positions which in other countries are held by civilians.
- 5. Effects of military roles and activities: The military has become an institutionalized and independent political force, reflecting not the interests of one man, but those which the officer corps itself perceives as the legitimate nature and role of the military establishment.
- 6. Author's conclusions: Tradition, increased budgets, interservice rivalry, and hemisphere defense programs have served to maintain and bolster the political influence of the military in Latin America. This offsets the rising influence of the urban middle and working classes.
- 7. Reviewer's comments: This brief essay is a satisfactory introduction to the problem.

Annotation 34

Author: Alexander, Robert J.

Title: "The Military," Today's Latin America.

Reference: New York: Doubleday, 1962.

Summary

The Iberian tradition of military dominance in politics has been historically accepted in Latin America. At the time of independence, the civilian elite had little experience in self-government and administration. The military segment of the elite looked upon itself as the only institution qualified to govern. The right of the military to intervene in politics was universally considered to be legitimate. A cyclic trend of military political activity began at the close of World War II. The United States must share the responsibility for the eventual role of the military in Latin American politics.

1. Locus: Latin America.

Tempus: Early 19th century to present.

Focus: Officer corps in major Latin American countries.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: Latin America is a potentially wealthy economic area whose political systems have hampered economic progress.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: "...the armed forces constitute one of the few elements of social mobility." It is possible for a boy of humble origins to enter the armed forces and by means of hard work, good luck, and coups to rise to a high rank. Whenever the military elite retreats somewhat from the political scene, more emphasis is placed on professionalization of the Armed Forces. The result has been an increased spirit of confidence.

- b. Personnel: Politically ambitious individuals, such as Juan Peron, General Odria, Rojas Pinilla, and Perez Jimenez, as well as Batista, used the resources of the army to come to power and were later overthrown by the same military forces.
4. Roles of the military establishment.
- a. Political: "...the right of the army to have the last word in politics was already strongly asserted during the wars for independence." The tradition of military intervention in politics was exceedingly difficult to change. Civilians turned to military friends in search of power, and the generals never hesitated to use all means at their disposal to challenge the government.
  - b. Social: As members of the elite, "the generals stood as bulwarks against social revolution." However, they were on the side of change, in contrast to the position of the church.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The military is still an important factor in Latin American politics, even though the nature of its participation has been somewhat different since World War II.
6. Author's conclusions: The Latin American political scene is strange to many U.S. citizens because the military competes actively with civilian interest groups on the national level. "The future functions of these armed forces seems to depend on many factors outside the military sphere"--mainly economic development and social transformation.

7. Reviewer's comments: This is a somewhat romantic survey of the subject and is, therefore, limited in its utility.

Annotation 35

Author: Arnade, Kurt Conrad.

Title: "The Technique of the Coup d'Etat in Latin America," Evolution of Latin American Government. Ed. Asher N. Christensen.

Reference: New York: Henry Holt, 1951.

Summary

The revolutions in Latin America are struggles between segments of the upper class. They are not generally concerned with issues outside this social stratum. The military, forming a part of this elite, is motivated by two factors when participating in coups: lack of combat turns their attention to politics, and the boring life of rural military posts makes political activity in the national capital an object of interest.

1. Theme/theory: The absence of war between Latin American states allows the military to turn their attention to politics. There has recently developed a marked difference in the behavioral patterns of senior and junior officers toward politics.
2. Rationale/evidence: A typical Latin American officer is one whose "lack of contact with society and with a cosmopolitan spread of ideas [makes] him susceptible to new doctrines [such as those] voiced by Hitler and Mussolini. Radical political activity of any sort spells escape from a tedious life of inaction, isolation, and seclusion." Junior military officers, police officials, and other government bureaucrats of lower rank are "voiceless pawns," and thus "alignment with the winning group is



a matter of paramount importance in terms of position and security. Where revolts have only a slight chance of success, military subordinates affiliate themselves with their commanders." Under different conditions, officers merely ignore government orders. Junior officers often proclaim neutrality by announcing that they are on the side of the people.

3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations; "About eighty-five percent of Latin American revolutions are relatively bloodless and of short duration because they lack the interest and active participation of the masses." It is quite difficult for nations outside of Latin America to alter this pattern of abrupt governmental change, since diplomatic or economic pressures have little effect on the internal political structures of these states.
4. Reviewer's comments: The author has made broad judgements on an extremely limited basis. For example, he does not distinguish one Latin American country from another; thus his statements are liable to misinterpretation.

Annotation 36

Author: Fitzgibbon Russell H.

Title: "Dictatorship and Democracy in Latin America."

Reference: International Affairs, XXXVI (January 1960), 48-57

Summary

The complex political situation in Latin America does not permit simple labeling of the countries in this region as democratic or dictatorial. At the present time, the continent is in a state of flux, with traditional institutions being altered to such a degree that their roles have changed

significantly. The power of the church and of the landed aristocracy has diminished, and there are indications that the military is developing a new consciousness which could serve to promote democratic ideals and institutions.

Reviewer's Comments

The author has suggested that simple terms do not adequately explain the political context of Latin America, and he provides an alternative method of identification.

Annotation 37

Author: Fitzgibbon, Russell H.

Title: "What Price Latin American Armies?"

Reference: The Virginia Quarterly Review, XXXVI (Autumn, 1960), 517-532.

Summary

The Latin American military, once characterized by the caudillo leading a personal following into the political arena, is now meeting an increased amount of resistance and competition from institutions arising from the industrial development of the area. The sophistication of organized labor and the rise of a managerial middle class has had an impact on the composition as well as the mentality of the Armed Forces. Although U. S. policy often encourages military intervention, the long-range trend, reinforced by the Mexican experience, seems to suggest that Latin American armies are becoming less political and more professional.

1. Theme/theory: The profound revolution taking place in Latin America is producing a reorganization of the internal power relationships. This has been significantly affecting the role of the military. The professionalization of the military has changed its attitudes toward politics and political institutions.

2. Rationale/evidence: The Armed Forces as such are no longer the dominant political factor merely because they possess the means of violence. The position of labor and an expanding middle class have a great influence on the range of policies and actions which the military can undertake. Those military men who have assumed direct power "have displayed a sense of responsibility to the public which is refreshingly new ...the added professionalization of the military should have operated, at least theoretically, to make the officer class more apolitical by giving them a professional training and pride not shared by the conventional politicians." On the other hand, the possession of improved weapons and material has worked in the opposite direction.
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: Forces of labor and industrialization will eventually put the Latin American military in its proper place and cause it to assume its proper role.
4. Reviewer's comments: This article is directed to a popular audience rather than an academic one.

Annotation 38

Author: Johnson, John J.

Title: The Military and Society in Latin America.

Reference: Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.

Summary

A review of Latin American militarism leads into a discussion of the role played by the elite of the Armed Forces when, on their own initiative or at the urging of politicians, they have behaved in an extramilitary

manner. The author examines the methods available to officers to influence policy decisions when they are not in direct control of government as well as when they are. Particular attention is paid to the socioeconomic background of the officer corps. While emphasis has been placed on the role of army officers, it is emphasized that the air forces and navies in certain countries (Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala, Argentina, and Peru) have shown an increasing disposition to challenge army dominance. The author feels it necessary to indicate the differences of civil-military relations in each country, and his more detailed case study of the Brazilian Armed Forces suggests the variation between Spanish and Portuguese influences upon Latin American military establishments.

Reviewer's Comments

This comprehensive study is traditionally historical in its approach and includes few of the new research techniques now available to social scientists of behavioral disciplines. The bibliography is lengthy and complete.

Annotation 39

Author: Lieuwen, Edwin.

Title: Arms and Politics in Latin America.

Reference: New York: Praeger, 1960

Summary

A historical survey of the role of the Armed Forces in 19th century Latin America develops into a political analysis of the changing role of the military in Latin American politics today. The author suggests that the Iberian historical tradition has molded an environment which invites military rule. "The decadence of the oligarchy, the political immaturity of the new groups aspiring to power...the lack of any strong, well-integrated

group aside from the military--all these combine to encourage militarism." While the role of the military is never identical in any two nations, three types of countries can be identified: (1) those in which the Armed Forces dominate politics--Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Panama; (2) those in which the military is in transition from political to nonpolitical institutions--Cuba, Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil; (3) those in which the Armed Forces are nonpolitical--Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica.

The survey is followed by a case study of the Mexican Army's change from a highly political institution into one which has been completely separated from political activities. The roles played by the leading military personalities in the process of "curbing militarism in Mexico" are emphasized.

The last half of the book deals with U.S.-Latin American relations as they relate to strategic military considerations, and with the difficulties attendant to maintaining consistent policies toward governments whose ruling elements are hostile to U.S. political ideals and whose patterns of civil-military relationships are in transition.

#### Reviewer's Comments

The author has done a commendable job in commenting on a broad subject covering 20 independent states. His detailed analysis of political trends in Mexico serves to substantiate the more general remarks about the other countries.

The second part of the book clearly shows the complexities faced by U.S. leaders desperately trying to formulate a consistent policy toward

the area without viola ing any of the principles by which we govern ourselves.

To some, the problem seems to be more difficult than in other developing areas of the world, because the tradition of military involvement in politics is 150 years old. To others, however, the Latin American military establishment has an opportunity to avoid many of the regressive actions taken in the past, and thus to step into its role as a modernizing force.

Annotation 40

Author: Lieuwen, Edwin.

Title: "The Military: Revolutionary Force."

Reference: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,  
CCGIV (March 1961), 30-40.

Summary

From the moment of independence, the military has played an active role in the politics of Latin America. Traditional defense roles have always been secondary to political activity. Whereas 19th-century military groups emphasized reform, in recent years the emphasis has been on stability. Even where military leaders are not titular government officials, high-ranking officers are influential behind the scenes, and civilian governments depend upon military support for survival. Understanding the nature of the Latin American military is of utmost importance to U. S. foreign-policy makers.

1. Theme/theory: The Armed Forces have been deeply involved in the wave of Latin American revolutions and counterrevolutions for the past 150 years. In dealing with Latin American political developments, the United States must often make

a choice between supporting stability through undemocratic military regimes or encouraging reform governments which are often unable to rule effectively. The tensions of the cold war do not make this choice an easy one.

2. Rationale/evidence: Although conservative in the 19th century, after World War I the officer corps was largely responsible for any reform which occurred. This trend lasted until the end of World War II, when the events of the cold war reversed this process. By the 1950's progressive military reform movements had largely disappeared. The U. S. military aid program has serious political implications which do not always serve our goal of helping long-range social and economic reform.
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: Military influence in Latin American politics will continue to be significant whether military men are actual rulers or not.  
"...the sociopolitical influence of the military is still very pronounced in two-thirds of the Latin American republics. And in all these countries, the armed forces are acting as a drag upon the area's social revolution. ... United States military policies aimed at stability, security, and opposition to communism may have inadvertently interfered with sociopolitical changes, and held up Latin America's revolution of rising expectations."
4. Reviewer's comments: The author's discussion of U. S. policy problems is excellent, but his theory of cycles of reform and revolution is an oversimplified explanation of the role of the military as a revolutionary force, as indicated by other

studies. The Latin American military cannot be discussed merely as a force resisting innovation.

Annotation 41

Author: Lieuwen, Edwin.

Title: "Neo-Militarism in Latin America: The Kennedy Administration's Inadequate Response."

Reference: Inter-American Economic Affairs, XVI (Spring 1963), 11-19.

Summary

The new wave of militarism in Latin America, brought on largely by the shock of the collapse of the Cuban Army under Batista, left the Kennedy administration unprepared to deal with the political problems in that area. U. S. policy toward Cuba encouraged this militarism, and though some of the military programs in Latin America were constructive (for example, civic action), the United States did not make it clear whether it favored increased professionalization or progressive military, social, and political activities.

1. Theme/theory: The Kennedy administration was partly responsible for the new wave of militarism in Latin America.
2. Rationale/evidence: The continued military assistance program and the U. S. policy of asking the cooperation of Latin American countries in isolating Cuba resulted in a series of military coups which ousted liberal and leftist regimes. Although the military aid was supposed to further the development of a collective security program, the Latin American countries have made little or no effort to cooperate with the United States in military action outside of their own borders.



The military establishments used their power internally only. Military training in the United States did not strengthen U. S. interests in Latin America. Progressive ideals did not lead to progress.

### Annotation 42

Title: "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America."

## Summary

While suggesting that most Latin American historians have dealt with this problem area inadequately, he commends Edwin Mieuwen, Theodore Wyckoff,

and Victor Alba for discussing accurately the interrelations between military and civilian elements in Latin America today.

1. Theme/theory: The author poses the following questions for interested scholars: (1) Do the interrelations between the military and society constitute a discrete problem for sociologists and historians? If so, what is the scope and structure of the problem? (2) What are (and what have been) the patterns of civil-military relations? Why has one pattern prevailed at one time rather than another, and why the change? (3) What are the elements and ingredients whose interaction produces patterns of civil-military relations? How do these elements interact to produce a particular pattern and change? Which research methods will best answer these questions?
2. Rationale/evidence: In suggesting a possible framework for study, the author states that, schematically, the following civil-military relations can be identified in types of states:
  - a. Praetorian state: the supplantation of the government by the military for nonmilitary purposes; characterized by a high degree of social and political disorganization with a low degree of military professionalization.
  - b. Gendarmist state: the rule of an individual using mercenary forces to gain power.
  - c. Garrison state: direct military rule which attempts to militarize society.
  - d. Civilist state: domination of the military establishment by civilian authority.
  - e. An unnamed type now emerging in Cuba.

3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: Latin America, or at least the Hispanic world, provides a convenient as well as a functional unit for the study of civil-military relations.

Possible types of studies include:

- a. Describing and analyzing the pattern at a given time.
- b. Analyzing the changing of patterns.
- c. Identifying elements in patterns of civil-military relations.
- d. Defining a pattern and explaining its origins and processes.

The author, a historian, suggests that his colleagues can profit from the more explicit definition of problems and assumptions drawn up by social and behavioral scientists and that it would be of great value to regard Latin American Armed Forces scientifically, possibly according to some of the functional roles suggested by Almond and Coleman. While no specific models are available for Latin America, S. P. Huntington's general model can be useful. In his terminology, Latin American military establishments could have the following characteristics: antimilitary ideology, high military political power, and low military professionalization. In addition, Stanislaw Andrzejewski's "military participation ratio" can be of use. This type of framework will help the historian ask more pertinent questions.

4. Reviewer's comments: This is a timely statement urging the necessity of broader participation among social scientists of various disciplines.

Annotation 43

Author: Needler, Martin.

Title: "The Army and Political Violence," Latin American Politics in Perspective.

Reference: Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1963.

Summary

This is a brief analysis of the scope and intensity of the Latin American military establishments' participation in politics.

1. Theme/theory: Military involvement in politics varies in degree as well as in kind. "The establishment of a stable democratic regime necessarily means strict subordination of the military to civilian authority."
2. Rationale/evidence: Degree of military involvement:
  - a. Minimal involvement--military establishment is present as one of several competing pressure groups (Uruguay, Chile, Mexico).
  - b. Military intervenes temporarily as guardian of the constitution (Argentina, Colombia).
  - c. Military holds a political veto power, and consultation with the military is required before policy action is taken (Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala).
  - d. Direct military rule in which the ruling group is a junta.
  - e. Personal military dictatorship (Trujillo)

Kind of military involvement:

- a. The military is used as a political tool by the government or opposition party.
- b. The army threatens violence by proclamation against the government or encouragement of public disorder.

- c. Army takes direct violent action by instigating coups or barracks revolts.

Government measures to restrict military political activity:

- a. Creation of competitive Armed Forces, national police forces, militias, and so forth.
  - b. Appeal to popular support.
  - c. Administrative measures: rotating commanding officers, retirement policies, and financial benefits.
  - d. Government victory in open battle; civil war.
- 3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: It is in the best interests of the United States and of Latin America to promote conditions which will minimize the political activity of the Armed Forces.
  - 4. Reviewer's comments: Such a simplified thesis cannot be positively proven or disproven, and its value is therefore somewhat limited.

#### Annotation 44

Author: Wyckoff, Theodore.

Title: "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics."

Reference: Western Political Quarterly, XIII (September 1960), 745-763.

#### Summary

Although a study of the Latin American military establishments requires attention to a wide variety of political institutions, they have all been influenced by the traditional role of the Armed Forces in Spain and Portugal. Three general types of civil-military relations can be discerned in Latin America today. The degree to which the military intervenes is often determined by the

presence of countervailing forces. The more sophisticated and institutionalized the nonmilitary pressure groups are, the less chance the military will have to impose its will on the political process.

1. Theme/theory: Latin American countries can be classified according to the degree to which their Armed Forces participate in politics. In two states, the military is considered never to be a political force; in some of the larger nations, the military sometimes intervenes under certain conditions, for specific reasons. In others, the military is always a factor in politics.
2. Rationale/evidence: Characteristics of those states where the military is always a factor in politics (Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay):
  - a. Small, isolated from the main current of world political action; in addition, the world is not overly concerned with their internal power structure.
  - b. Social structure simple and clearly stratified with the upper class of European stock.
  - c. The economic situation chronically unstable.
  - d. Political control in the hands of a small elite.
  - e. Administration characterized by authoritarianism and police suppression.
  - f. The Armed Forces large in proportion to the total population, but poorly trained.
  - g. Military ranks reflect the country's social stratification.
  - h. Military life attractive because of material advantages.
  - i. Senior officers conservative; junior officers more liberal.

Characteristics of those states where the military is never a factor in politics (Uruguay and Costa Rica):

- a. A small country with relative social homogeneity and a single racial strain of European stock; literacy rate relatively high.
- b. Labor productivity high, as are wages; the general economic environment is stable and capital is readily available for investment.
- c. An effective constitutional system operating; bureaucratic administration and elections fairly honest; and defense expenditures low.

(Uruguay underwent much civil-military strife during the 19th century, but was able to conserve a civilian elite which limits the military role to external defense.

Costa Rica has no army, navy, or air force.)

Characteristics of states where the military is sometimes a factor in politics (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela):

- a. Geographically large states with complex social structures.
- b. Economic diversity coupled with a lack of national consensus on how the economy should be developed.
- c. Political diversity regionally; national government having little power without the direct support of the Armed Forces.
- d. Important political events taking place in the national capital, but changes there seldom cause changes in the rural areas.
- e. Military power slides along a continuum from direct control to maintaining a veto.

- f. Armed Forces large, Officer corps competent, look upon themselves as defenders of the constitution.
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: "The above examples are only three points on a continuum. Many interim points are referred to only by implication. ...the underlying social and political conditions are more significant in the political life of the country than the actual role of the military. It is not in itself primarily responsible for the absence or presence of democracy or democratic institutions. ...where democracy flourishes, even where it flourishes with occasional military intervention, there is also to be found the condition of powerful countervailing forces. ...in countries where the military is always a factor in politics, there is also to be found an absence of countervailing forces. ...under certain conditions, the military, far from being a threat to democratic institutions, may serve to uphold them."
4. Reviewer's comments: Certainly this is one of the more comprehensive essays written on this subject.

#### MIDDLE EAST

##### Case Studies

##### Annotation 45

Author: Carleton, Alford.

Title: "The Syrian Coups d'Etat of 1949."

Reference: Middle East Journal, IV (January 1950), 1-11

##### Summary

The frustration of the Arab world over its defeat in the Palestine war was mirrored in Syria by the overthrow of President al-Quwwatli in



March 1949 by a military coup which "restored order and a measure of public confidence." The military regime of army Colonel Husni Za'im at first had a certain measure of public support, but his isolation from formal political organizations and his evident "love of pomp and personal aggrandizement" ultimately led to his downfall in August 1949, when he was replaced by another military group.

1. Locus: Middle East.

Tempus: 1949.

Focus: Intervention of military officers in national politics.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: A military regime further isolated itself from major institutions of political power by its association with certain Muslim minority groups.

b. Political-governmental situation: A military regime abolished parliament and appointed officers to provisional administrative posts with both civil and military authority. In addition, police and gendarmerie forces were placed under military command, separated from the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior.

3. Roles of the military establishment.

a. Political: The military regime, while delegating administrative positions to army personnel, "made little effort to win over old parties, to link the regime with one of them to the exclusion of the other," or to build a party of its own. Thus, a political vacuum continued.

b. Social: The fact that military regimes can assume power so easily is a clear indication that "the people of Syria prefer the secularization of life...."

- c. Economic: The new regime announced "the immediate undertaking of numerous public works--construction of a harbor, railroad building and the laying of a trans-Arabian pipeline."
4. Effects of military roles and activities: The military regime was unable to impose any significant changes in the political, economic, or social institutions and processes of Syria.
5. Author's conclusions: While the military regime which replaced that of Colonel Za'im may have existed "on a more democratic basis ...the tendency of the military to continue to maneuver behind the scenes...remained a disturbing and unpredictable political factor."
6. Reviewer's comments: The author has some justification for suggesting that any constructive and progressive national consciousness on the part of army officers intervening in politics was absent.

Annotation 46

Author: Khadduri, Majid.

Title: "The Role of the Military in Iraqi Society," The Military in the Middle East. Ed. S. N. Fisher.

Reference: Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963.

Summary

A review of the political events in Iraq since 1936 in which the military has been directly involved. The author asserts that a major driving force for change in the political system was the rising tension between the old oligarchy and the new generation, of which the military was a significant part. The military is viewed as a force which intervenes

after the collapse of a parliamentary system and the continued feuding of diverse ethnic groups.

1. Locus: Middle East.

.. Tempus: 1936-1962.

Focus: The political actions of Iraqi Army elements.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: Iraq is a nation whose various ethnic groups have little concept of nationalism and who struggle for political power. Military personnel often view this situation as chaotic and intervene in hopes of establishing order.

b. Political-governmental situation: Iraq is also a nation whose experience with parliamentary government has been totally unsuccessful, thus encouraging, time after time, military takeover of the national government.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: "The Army, as one of several national organizations, was inevitably involved in the struggle between the oligarchs and the new generation. Many of the leading army officers were either directly associated with ideological groupings or indirectly influenced by them."

b. Personnel: The group of "free officers," who often met in places outside the national capital after 1954, was preoccupied with gaining military support which resulted in the coup of July 1958.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

a. Political: The military have been in the forefront of political activity in Iraq from 1936 until the present day.

The first military coup took place in 1936, the second coup in 1938, five coups occurred in 1940-41, followed by three more, in 1948, 1952, and 1958.

- b. Social: Arab military leaders, including the Iraqi, have tacitly approved of a secular state and of the disestablishment of Islam.
- c. Economic: The army has been eager to create an economic base for a modern state through modified socialist methods.
- 5. Effects of military roles and activities: The military leaders, seeing the inadequacy of parliamentary government, sought to promote a political position which was progressive and disciplined. At no time have they been successful in this.
- 6. Author's conclusions: "Governments, like other social institutions, must develop by a slow and steady process. Iraq may well experience more social upheaval before she discovers the form of democratic government that fits her social structure."
- 7. Reviewer's comments: The author has drawn largely on previous articles for this presentation. For example, see "The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics," American Political Science Review (Annotation 56).

Annotation 47

Author: Kirk, George

Title: "The Role of the Military in Society and Government: Egypt,"

The Military in the Middle East. Ed. S. N. Fisher.

Reference: Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963.

Summary

Under the provisions of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, Egyptians were allowed, for the first time in history, to qualify for the

military academy and officer-training programs. The first of these officer candidates later saw the secondary role of Egyptian forces in World War II and the humiliating defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1949. Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser and his Free Officer Corps led the military elite into Egyptian politics, beginning what they hoped would be a complete transformation of Egyptian society.

1. Locus: Middle East.

Tempus: 1952-1962.

Focus: The role of the Egyptian Army in national governmental, social, and political institutions.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: The government is making great efforts to rebuild Egyptian society into a highly nationalistic one; the economy, guided by government administrators, is to include a variety of light and heavy industries in addition to an increased output of staple crops.

b. Political-governmental situation: A relatively young elite of government officials, mostly former army officers, guides the political activities of the population through the National Union, a nationwide political organization which attempts to maintain organized support for the regime.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: The Armed Forces is one of the major institutions involved in the promotion of what the regime hopes will be a national consciousness on the part of the masses.

b. Personnel: Most of the political leaders are ex-army officers, whom Nasser believes to have the technical skills,

efficiency, and honesty to participate in national government administration.

4. Roles of the military establishment.
  - a. Political: The army participates in the various activities of the National Union, which has many ex-officers among its officials.
  - b. Social: The army has offered a channel through which Egyptian Arabs have risen to national prominence. The officer elite has taken credit for eliminating the traditional class order of society.
  - c. Economic: Military officers have directed several economic programs, most of which have failed.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: At one time, military personnel were involved in almost every sector of Egyptian society as administrative leaders. This has changed somewhat, and the regime now relies on civilian experts. However, ultimate responsibility rests with Nasser, and his most influential advisers are members of the original Free Officer Corps.
6. Author's conclusions: The regime's hopes of associating the nonpolitical masses with itself in a positive manner have not been fulfilled to any great extent.
7. Reviewer's comments: The author has not conducted original research but rather has relied heavily on one good major source and several secondary accounts.

Annotation 48

Author: Lerner, Daniel, and Richard D. Robinson.

Title: "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force."

Reference: World Politics, XIII (October 1960), 19-44.

Summary

The emergence of republican Turkey as a state in which political democracy and economic stability developed simultaneously is largely explained by the elimination of the military from the arena of active politics and the deep involvement of the Turkish Armed Forces in the social and economic transformation of the country into a modern state.

1. Locus: Middle East.

Tempus: 1923-1960.

Focus: The Turkish Army made constructive contributions to the developing processes which shaped social conditions in post-World War I Turkey.

2. National environment.

a. Socioeconomic situation: The national regime was determined to eliminate all aspects of Ottoman social tradition. This required a "transformed political and social system which would permit the people of Turkey to realize more fully their human potential. Illiteracy, debilitating disease, religious dogma and fatalism, subordination of women--all of these had to go."

b. Political-governmental situation: The government was founded by military leaders whose policy was to isolate the Armed Forces from political activity while using their skills and abilities to promote national interests. The abrupt change

which took place in 1960 can be attributed partly to the rising gap between the "revolution of rising expectations," and the "capacity to absorb."

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

- a. Institutional: The military establishment enjoys great national prestige because of its immense contributions to the education and training of the nation's youth. Significant progress in dispersing its skills to the civilian sector has made it a symbol of discipline, efficiency, and constructiveness.
- b. Personnel: The policy of isolating high military officers from politics over a period of 35 years was apparently successful until the surprise coup in 1961. Since that time, a military dictatorship has ruled the country.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

- a. Political: Until the late 1950's, the military was subservient to civilian control. At that time certain elements in the army began to see their role as one of defending the constitutional form of government from the increasing abuses of President Menderes.
- b. Social: The policy of assigning troops to areas outside their home region has increased the national consciousness of many recruits. The new skills acquired by many soldiers have changed their attitudes toward traditional social and familial relations.
- c. Economic: The army has contributed to housing construction, road building, and other material developments, with the aid and advice of military assistance groups. Young men



returning to rural villages from the army can be the force behind technical innovation. They may suggest the use of modern agricultural equipment. They may be the only persons able to drive and to maintain a tractor. Thus the technical absorption capacity of the civilian sector in Turkey has been increased by military training programs.

- d. Educational: "...general education may be identified with the military in the public mind, by reason of the large-scale program of basic education now being instituted by the Turkish Army." Draftsman have a 7-week course in reading, writing, arithmetic, and social studies.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: The transformation of the Turkish military from a traditional elite dominating national politics to a professional army under the control of a civilian government had a profound effect on the nature of Turkish politics, social organization, and economic development. The training programs of the army have had a "multiplier effect whereby the civilian sector has benefited from those having military experience." The military has been the vanguard in raising the level of aspiration of the Turkish people. When military aspirations began to differ sharply from those of the civilian elite, the army intervened once again in politics.
6. Authors' conclusions: The pattern of civil-military relations and the contributions made by the Armed Forces to the development of modern institutions and attitudes in Turkey were of vital significance to the peaceful evolutionary emergence of that nation as a democratic state. Only when the civilian elite failed in

their leadership did this pattern break down. The result was a military coup of doubtful legitimacy and limited popular support.

7. Reviewer's comments: This is an informative but somewhat romantic view of the role of the Armed Forces in Turkey during the 37 years of the Republic. The authors have condemned the new military regime prematurely and perhaps have exaggerated the degree of control the civilians had over the military establishment.

Annotation 49

Author: Rustow, Dankwart A.

Title: "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic."

Reference: World Politics, XI (July 1959), 513-552.

Summary

The military played a vital role for 300 years in the Ottoman Empire of Turkey, and the major cause of its downfall was military defeat. The Armed Forces were the instrument by which the country was revitalized by Kemal Ataturk, who "fashioned a set of civilian institutions to which the military were increasingly subordinated."

1. Locus: Middle East

Tempus: 1908-1959.

Focus: Political role of certain military personnel in the Turkish republic.

2. National environment.

- a. Political-governmental situation: "The army and its officer corps were propelled into action because all other political forces were (in 1918) disqualified from offering any effective

initiative."From the time of the founding of the republic, the leaders chose to administer the country as civilian rather than as military rulers. However, the separation of the military from the civilian sphere has never been complete.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

- a. Institutional: While the professional integrity of the army suffered as a result of its domination of the political scene after the Young Turk revolution, its professionalism was revitalized by the policies of President Ataturk and President Inonu.
- b. Personnel: Kemal Ataturk and his immediate followers stated that continuation of their military careers would restrict the service they could give the nation during the early years of the Republic. This policy helped to crystallize the trend of withdrawing the army from politics.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

- a. Political: The leaders of the early years of the Turkish Republic were military men who were dedicating themselves to laying a strong foundation for a secular state in which the Armed Forces would be subservient to civilian political leaders.
- b. Social: An analysis of the political leaders serving Ataturk indicates that Turkey was ruled by relatively young men from Anatolia, whereas before Ataturk's rule, high government officials were largely the older members of wealthy urban classes.

5. Effects of military roles and activities: The apparent determination of Ataturk and his followers to separate the military from the arena

of partisan politics was fairly successful in creating a political framework in which national rule was in the hands of political leaders. However, military men were often active in politics after their retirement from the army, and regional military commanders often had great political and judicial influence.

6. Author's conclusions: "Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), under the impact of the defeat of 1918, resolutely cast aside all dreams of imperial glory--whether of the Ottoman, Panturkish, or Panslavic variety.... Considerations of military and foreign policy prompted the Kemalists to strengthen the domestic cohesion and civilian organization of the Turkish body politic." Thus, for the first time in Middle Eastern history, civilian domination of the Armed Forces was accepted as legitimate.
7. Reviewer's comments: The author suggests that the military was never completely divorced from politics in republican Turkey. The events 2 years after the publication of this paper clearly indicate that not only was the military never out of the political arena, but perhaps it was at no time as subservient to civilian rule as it first appeared.

Annotation 50

Author: Torrey, Gordon H.

Title: "The Role of the Military in Society and Government in Syria and the Formation of the UAR," The Military in the Middle East.

Ed. S. N. Fisher.

Reference: Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963.

Summary

The political activities of several prominent military officials are reviewed, and their associations with the major parties of Syria are analyzed.

The rising influence of army officers in contact with the pan-Arab Ba'ath Party, which promoted union with Egypt, and their roles after the United Arab Republic was established are of particular significance.

1. Locus: Middle East.

Tempus: 1946-1958.

Focus: The changing role and significance of the army in Syria at mid-century.

2. National environment.

a. Political-governmental situation: Syria was a newly-independent nation in the early stages of forming national institutions; the military was a legitimate political force which could intervene at will to protect its vital interests or to promote revolutionary or reform measures.

3. Characteristics of military establishment.

a. Institutional: "Mirroring the Syrian social structure much more closely than did the Egyptian army that of Egypt, the Syrian Army was a combined volunteer-conscript force.... Leadership came largely from the upper echelons of Syrian society and in many ways was connected with the nation's [best families]...."

b. Personnel: High army officers, including Colonel Husni al-Za'im, Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, and Abd Sarraj were focal points of national politics throughout the decade of the 1950's.

4. Roles of the military establishment.

a. Political: Generally, the army entered politics when it felt its interests were threatened. Although it was vitally concerned about possible alliances with nations which might

challenge its prestige, the army was largely responsible for union with Egypt.

- b. Social: The army offered opportunities for prestige to those from middle-class families. Recruits were largely from rural areas and were introduced to an urban environment upon induction.
  - c. Economic: The military regimes thought in terms of developing state-owned industrial enterprises.
  - d. Educational: The Homs Military Academy imbued its cadets with pan-Arab ideals. Generally as a result of military education, the officers had little in common with the country's traditional social and political processes.
5. Effects of military roles and activities: Military reaction to the humiliating defeat in the Palestine war of 1948 led to much suspicion of civilian rule in Syria. However, the military "lacked both the will and the ability to carry out social revolution.... Internal political maneuvering for power occupied so much of the various governments' energies that social reform fell into the background." A Soviet loan in 1957 may have initiated the military regime's desire to "develop the country's economic potential by means of state enterprise."
6. Author's conclusions: The army seems to have the largest single body of public support and at present "appears to be serving as a safety valve against extremes of right or left."
7. Reviewer's comments: The most significant contribution of this article lies in its explanation of the political ties of important officers in the Syrian Army.

Author: Vatikiotis, P. J.

Title: The Egyptian Army in Politics.

Reference: Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961.

Summary

This work is an analysis of the transformation of the conspiritorial Free Officer Corps into a ruling governmental elite which has affected every aspect of Egyptian society.

In an attempt to prove that no other group had the capability of assuming leadership, the military regime is in the process of building an Egyptian nation which will be conscious of three significant factors:

(1) The total population must participate in the molding of a new Egypt; this complete mobilization of human resources will require dedication, restraint, and patience. (2) While dedicating themselves to a national effort, Egyptians must never forget that they are a part of the revival of pan-Arabism in the Middle East. (3) Although Islam has a role to play in this movement, the regime is committed to a secular concept of national identity, loyalty, and legitimacy; however, religion must be deferred to in order to maintain contact with the masses, until the desired standards of education and economic improvement are achieved.

The author concludes that "the arm· has recently emerged as the most progressive element in Arab society today, as the Army officer corps appears to be the most willing among Arab groups to seek empirically rational solutions to outstanding problems," and that, "the officer corps has appeared as the group most inclined to push Egyptian society into the modern age by its serious commitment to secular policies and institutions."

Reviewer's Comments

This is a comprehensive study of Egyptian development under military rule and the leadership of Coronel Gamal Abdul Nasser. It is a valuable source for those investigating trends and problems of a society where a military ruling group has attempted total mobilization of the population.

Annotation 52

Author: Weiker, Walter F.

Title: The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics.

Reference: Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1963.

Summary

This is a complete and comprehensive analysis of the events and circumstances leading up to the military coup d'etat in Turkey on May 27, 1960. The author discusses in detail the composition of the military junta and the reforms initiated by this National Unity Committee. In defending his thesis that the military leaders were sincere in their desire to create a set of circumstances that would allow the Armed Forces to retire from the active political scene, the author shows how these army officers took concrete steps to incorporate civilian leadership into the national government and laid the foundation for peaceful parliamentary elections in October 1961.

Reviewer's Comments

The author has made a significant contribution to the field of civil-military relations. Such a detailed study of a country which has characteristics of developed as well as underdeveloped nations offers valuable data for comparative analysis.



## Essays

### Annotation 53

Author: Badeau, John S.

Title: "The Revolt Against Democracy."

Reference: Journal of International Affairs, XIII (1959), 149-156.

#### Summary

The many military coups d'etat of the past decade in the Middle East reflect the failure of the parliamentary form of government in that area. This is in part due to the fact that many aspects of parliamentary democracy are alien forms of rule, having been imposed during the mandate period following World War I. Another reason for military men often intervening in politics is that they have characteristics of progressiveness combined with the "strong man" personality required in this part of the world.

1. Theme/theory: Military personnel have intervened in political events as a result of the failure of parliamentary government. Army officers have certain attributes which qualify them for political leadership at this time.
2. Rationale/evidence: The substance of such a system as parliamentary government (that is, mass political participation, fair representation, and so forth) was lacking. Therefore, the structure of the political system collapsed, and the army, perhaps the most nationalistic of government institutions, did not hesitate to intervene. "In most situations, the army has been the only segment of educated life that has consistently stood outside the entanglements of party politics."

3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: One must not think of this type of military rule as necessarily harmful. Such dictatorships should not be compared with fascism or nazism. This type of "strong-man" rule may even lay the basis for a functioning democracy, as it did in Turkey.
4. Reviewer's comments: Although this offers an oversimplified explanation of a complex problem, it is a useful introduction.

Annotation 54

Author: Boxhall, P. G.

Title: "Focus on Modern Egypt."

Reference: Army Quarterly, LXXXVI (April 1963), 44-50.

Summary

For the first time in modern Egyptian history a regime of armed forces personnel has given the country a stable government which has directed economic and social development. The constructive contributions that Nasser has made to Egypt are indisputable, but whether he has been successful in promoting Arab nationalism is debatable.

1. Locus: Middle East.

Tempus: 1952-1963.

Focus: President Nasser's leadership.

2. National environment.

- a. Socioeconomic situation: While a great number of Egyptians have benefited from the economic measures instituted by Nasser's military regime it is "unlikely that the Egyptian standard of living will rise appreciably for a considerable time."

- b. Political-governmental situation: The large-scale corruption and inefficiency of the political parties was a major cause of the coup d'etat of 1952. One of the first measures of the military regime was to ban organized political opposition. Although the regime has sponsored a mass political organization, the National Union, the government must be described as authoritarian.
- 3. Characteristics of the military establishment.
  - a. Personnel: The members of the Armed Forces who are active in national affairs come from middle and lower class social groupings. President Nasser has become "the embodiment of modern socialist Egypt."
- 4. Roles of the military establishment.
  - a. Political: Success in eliminating organized opposition has not provided an alternative to mass political activity. The General Congress was provided for under a national charter, with members being selected by high officials of the regime.
  - b. Social: The military regime has encouraged the ideals of pan-Arabism with Egypt as the guiding nation. Although Nasser has won much popular support in the Arab world, other Arab governments are somewhat suspicious of him.
  - c. Economic: Land reform and nationalization have been the two main goals of the military regime. The Armed Forces do not look adversely on aid from either West or East.
- 5. Effect of military roles and activities: The military regime has --in 10 years--transformed Egypt into a socialist state, stabilizing the internal situation, but disrupting the Arab world in general.

especially when the Israeli question is brought up. The Egyptian Army, though modern by Arab standards, is "almost certainly still inadequate to take on Israeli forces."

6. Author's conclusions: It is doubtful whether this regime is capable of handling the more complex problems that will face Nasser in the future.
7. Reviewer's comments: This is a brief discussion with little attempt at analysis.

Annotation 55

Author: Campbell, John.

Title: "The Role of the Military in the Middle East: Past Patterns and New Directions," The Military in the Middle East. Ed. S. N. Fisher.

Reference: Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963.

Summary

A general review of the means, circumstances, patterns, and results of military intervention in Middle Eastern countries is offered.

1. Theme/theory: "Force is a generally accepted means of political action. The military...therefore, is generally the ultimate power, whether it is on the stage or in the background....Perhaps the most compelling [reason for military intervention in politics] is that in an unformed society the army is often the only institution that provides discipline, a sense of mission, education, and training in administrative and technical skills." The patterns of military-civilian relations are a reflection of the elite patterns and the social structure as a whole.
2. Rationale/evidence: The military sees itself as a new elite class, and a good part of the population accepts this view without question.

Its legitimacy as a political force is further strengthened by its control of the means of violence. There are various patterns of military roles: Israel has an army which is a reflection of society (that is, a citizen army), whereas the other states have armies which are forces outside of society, but which often dominate it. In these states, the army acts in support of an established order (for example, Iran and Jordan) or as a force of revolution and reform (for example, Turkey and Egypt). In several other countries, the distinction is not so clear. There are no states with a truly professional army. Only in two states (Egypt and Pakistan) have military regimes had some degree of success in promoting stable government and eliminating government corruption.

3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: Regardless of the results of military rule, when the new officer class has taken power, there has been a break with the past so complete that the traditional order will never return, and signs point to more, not less, military control of government in this region.
4. Reviewer's comments: This essay is an adequate summing up of the problem areas brought up at the conference held by the Graduate Institute of World Affairs at Ohio State University in November-December 1961.

Annotation 36

Author: Khadduri, Majid.

Title: "The Role of the Military in the Middle East."

Reference: American Political Science Review, XLVII (June 1953), 511-524.

Summary

The position of the army officer elite in the power structure of Middle East countries is analyzed. The army is looked upon as a force which steps

into a political vacuum created by un disciplined civilian democratic institutions. The author regards this as in the interest of the United States, since the officer corps is strongly anti-Communist.

1. Theme/theory: Many officers look upon the army as a stepping-stone to political power. Although the military can offer many positive contributions to development, the danger of military rule is that it will be reluctant to relinquish power once it has achieved it. Thus democratic institutions have little chance of developing.
2. Rationale/evidence: The military can serve as a constructive political force, for it tends to be a progressive institution in favor of social reform and eliminates much extremism in the political process. In addition, the many skills that are acquired through military experience are vital to any nation interested in improving its economic and technological base.
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: The author implies that the military governments which have developed in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq are not necessarily detrimental to economic development and political stability and may in the near future produce an environment in which democratic institutions will be viable.
4. Reviewer's comments: The author is a keen observer of the political process in the Middle East, and his suggestion that military regimes in this region can be genuinely constructive must be seriously considered.

Author: Newman, K. J.

Title: "The New Monarchies of the Middle East."

Reference: Journal of International Affairs, XIII (1959), 157-168.

Summary

The military dictatorships in Egypt, Iraq, and Pakistan are merely different forms of monarchy ("the rule of one whose will and power are supreme"), which has deep roots in Middle East history. The techniques and symbols of rule are quite similar to those of oriental despots of the past and have something in common with European monarchs of the 18th and 19th centuries.

1. Theme/theory: In these countries, there is a sociological affinity between army and monarch.
2. Rationale/evidence: Military leaders of the present, as kings in the past, see themselves as "fathers of the land," protecting the people against the corruption and selfishness of parliamentary democracy. As kings were the symbols of the state, military leaders claim to be the symbols of nationalism.
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: "Military monarchies are the rule and not the exception in the Middle East." The military will continue to dominate in Egypt and Iraq. The familiarity of Pakistan with a dyarchic system of government may indicate that military rule is only a temporary phenomenon.
4. Reviewer's comments: The author's discussion includes historical evidence, classical and contemporary political analysis, and a few comments on sociological factors. It is often difficult to follow his line of reasoning because of the many factors considered.

Author: Rustow, Dankwart A.

Title: "The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics," The Military in the Middle East. Ed. S. N. Fisher.

Reference: Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963.

Summary:

The historical, social, political, and administrative circumstances which permit military intervention in politics are reviewed, and the distinctive patterns in civil-military relations in both monistic states and those with some experience with parliamentary regimes are considered.

1. Theme/theory: The Islamic religion gives a high degree of legitimacy to military power. Violence is often the prime factor in Middle Eastern politics. Military intervention occurs after several years of national independence. Liberal movements in Western Europe have had a great impact. Military intervention occurs after battlefield defeat, civilian bureaucratic chaos, and popular unrest.
2. Rationale/evidence: In 1962, nine of the thirteen countries in the Middle East had military regimes. "Lack of agreement on basic constitutional principles...contributes to an atmosphere where violence becomes not only the ultima ratio, but all too often the prima ratio of politics." Under the Ottoman Empire, the military served as a channel of social mobility. When the military became aware of its independent power, it became a leading force in nationalist movements. In the Middle East, direct military intervention in politics occurs after 4-5 years of independence. The humiliating defeats during the Palestine war had a



profound effect on the attitudes of the military officer corps toward civilian regimes. They often held civilians responsible for corruption and inefficiency.

3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: Monistic statements about the role of the military should be rejected. In this region, distinctions between civilian and military politics are often artificial; once the military steps into the political arena it takes on the common characteristics. "The ultimate success of a military regime is its skills in allowing and promoting effective civilian institutions for ruling."
4. Reviewer's comments: This is a sobering introduction that tends to restrain any exaggerated notions one may have about the positive developmental role of the military in Middle Eastern states.

Annotation 59

Author: Rustow, Dankwart A.

Title: "Turkey's Second Try at Democracy."

Reference: Yale Review, LII (June 1963), 518-538.

Summary

The military coup of May 1960 was evidence of the unevenness of political and economic development in Turkey during the past decades. Although there are encouraging signs from the broadened political base, it is clear that the current political structure is unable to incorporate the interests of the new pressure groups which have emerged in the past few years. The resulting frustration and the precedent of 1961 may encourage further military intervention.

1. Theme/theory: The net results of Turkey's first democratic experiment were an enormous widening of the base of political participation, the emergence of new groups of leaders, and a faster if uneven pace of economic development. Although the Turkish military had a generation of tradition of abstaining from direct political action, President Menderes encouraged their new role by undermining the constitutional order. The army's intervention was dictated by circumstance, justified by constitutional principle, vindicated by popular acclaim, and--in contrast to military coups in other countries--redeemed by a quick return to democracy.
2. Rationale/evidence: Political activity spread from the cities to the villages; opposition parties appeared and elected doctors, lawyers, businessmen, and farmers to the national assembly. But industrial expansion was frustrated by lack of distribution channels and mass markets, and much corruption existed in the various business expansion programs. President Menderes repressed opposition, political activity, and student protest. He had "withdrawn into a mental world of delusion, making indiscriminate use of martial law. ...the presence of ex-soldiers at the head of the government may for the moment furnish one of the best guarantees against any new coup. General Inonu has been as effective in keeping the armed forces out of politics in Turkey since 1961 as General DeGaulle has been in France since 1958."
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: "The next five or six years are likely to prove decisive for Turkey's second experiment

with democracy....There are many encouraging and disquieting signs. The outcome deserves our fullest sympathy and support."

4. Reviewer's comments: The author, one of several respected scholars of contemporary Turkish politics, attempts to rationalize and justify the military coup. It is difficult to prove that this step was constitutionally justified, but his conclusion that the future political role of the military is unclear is very sound.

Annotation 60

Author: Salem, Elie.

Title: "Emerging Government in the Arab World."

Reference: Orbis, VI (Spring 1962), 102-118.

Summary

The failure of democratic parliamentaryism in the Middle East has led to a revival of traditional types of Arab leadership based on charismatic authoritarianism. Because Muslim political tradition accepts the legitimacy of force, Arab nationalists now look to the army for leadership. The military man has become the symbol of one who can guide these countries through the dissolution of the old order into modern nation-state systems.

1. Theme/theory: Parliamentary government failed in the Arab world because it was an alien system imposed on people whose culture demands authoritarian rule. In recent years, the military has become the predominant leadership group because it combines the characteristics of authoritarianism and modernization. Also, a military government is more attentive to the needs of the masses.
2. Rationale/evidence: "Islamic history is the history of authoritarian government." Reinforced by experience with the Mameluks and the

Ottoman Empire, the people of the Arab world have respected those leaders who are dynamic and dignified. Representative multiple party systems have been largely irrelevant. It is believed that "the army is the real representative of the nation, since it is recruited mainly from the masses. National military leaders acclaim their lower class origins. These radical regimes are clearly committed to a policy of modernization, enhancing the national will and creating a new socioeconomic order concomitant with the needs of the age."

3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: The contribution of military rule lies in the fields of administrative efficiency, social reform, and industrialization.
4. Reviewer's comments: Although the author has given a reasonable explanation of the historical significance of authoritarian rule, his statements on the modern role of the military rule are questioned by other experts in this area.

#### Annotation 61

Author: Sharabi, H. B.

Title: "Parliamentary Government and Military Autocracy in the Middle East."

Reference: Orbis, IV (Fall 1960), 338-355.

#### Summary

The imposition of parliamentary government never resulted in a genuine democracy in the Middle East. In its corrupted form it served to maintain the power and prestige of traditional aristocracies. Thus, when military takeovers occur, there is no shift from democracy to dictatorship, but merely a change from one form of nondemocratic rule to another.

1. Theme/theory: The most effective agency for political change has been the armed strength of the military. The impact of Western institutions, skills, and technology has manifested itself first and foremost through the military establishment.
2. Rationale/evidence: Military strength outweighs any religious or moral censure. The politicians now cry "Infiltrate the army!" as part of their plan for gaining power. The military establishments (especially those in Turkey and Japan) have been the first to become aware of the fact that any challenge to the Western world must be backed up by military force. In copying Western military techniques, skills, and so forth (often with the help of European military instructors and advisers), the military was the first to manifest characteristics of stability in Middle East countries.
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: Although the military regimes in the Middle East are somewhat more stable than the regimes they replace, this does not mean that their prime interests lie in promoting democracy. The military rulers are mainly interested in maintaining and promoting their own power.
4. Reviewer's comments: The brief analysis of civilian interest in infiltrating the military is particularly interesting in that it indicates the significant prestige of the military in this region.

Author: Vatikiotis, P. J.

Title: "Dilemmas of Political Leadership in the Arab Middle East."

Reference: International Affairs, XXXVII (April 1961), 189-203.

Summary

The military regimes in the Middle East face the dilemma of promoting secular Arab nationalism in a social environment of Islam. In the case of the United Arab Republic, the government has used religious symbolism as a technique for integrating Islam into the instruments of national policy. As this technique has been copied in other Middle East states, Arabism becomes a competitive factor. Thus tension continues among the military regimes in the Arab world.

1. Theme/theory: The Egyptian military regime constantly faces the problem of transforming Arab philosophy into political policy. The Egyptian Government has attempted to promote technical skills copied from the West while maintaining ethical inspiration from the East. This is part of a policy to blend secular and religious factors into an Egyptian national consciousness.
2. Rationale/evidence: The Egyptian Government, in trying to curb the political influence of religious leaders, has not eliminated them as was done in Turkey under Ataturk. Instead they are placed in a position of subordination, their talents being utilized within the Islamic Congress. This institution, an agency of the presidency of the republic, aims to promote the "educational and social welfare of all Muslims." It has been argued that the army officer corps is very 'tradition-minded. Yet many of the younger officers in prominent positions are not highly traditional. In addition, the Western industrial and political model is not the only one available

to them. They can now look to Chinese and Soviet programs of modernization.

3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: "There are today many Arabic-speaking nation-states, but the Arab nation has yet to emerge. The issue is whether the 'modernizing' military rules of the Arab countries concerned should strengthen this feeling in order to create an Arab nation or the Arab nation, or whether they should discourage it. Islam without Arabism has been and is possible. The question is, can there be Arabism without Islam? To resolve this issue is no mean political task for any ruling institution, even an army-controlled one."
4. Reviewer's comments: The author has dealt well with a subject which is often confusing to the Western observer.

GENERAL

Essays

Annotation 63

Author: Andrzejewski, Stanislaw.

Title: Military Organization and Society.

Reference: London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.

Summary

In an attempt to draw up a new construct by which to analyze civil-military relationships, the author introduces a set of variables which he deems necessary for adequate understanding of the nature of the problem area. In discussing the various possible forms of roles of military establishments in society, three important factors must be understood: the military participation ratio; the degree of military subordination; and the degree of military cohesion. The

type of military establishment can be determined by the high or low degree of the three factors.

A set of technical terms is devised to explain the various social settings in which the military can find itself. This, it is said, is a contribution to progress in social science research.

Reviewer's Comments

The author is somewhat unjust in his condemnation of his colleagues, who, he suggests, have contributed next to nothing to the advancement of military sociology. While rejecting most concepts and terms which had been generally accepted as useful, Mr. Andrzejewski has invented a new set of terms which are largely incomprehensible without the glossary which he includes at the end of the book.

Nevertheless, this volume contributed significantly to the rising interest in civil-military relations, and much of the theory which is now being applied to the role of the military in developing nations has been influenced by the author's concepts and opinions.

Annotation 64

Author: Daalder, H.

Title: The Role of the Military in Emerging Nations.

Reference: The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1962.

Summary

This is a brief essay on the way in which the modern nature of the military affects the development process in developing states.

1. Theme/theory: Although the adoption of Western cultural attitudes by elite groups in developing states has isolated them from much of the indigenous society, the skills of the military do contribute to the transformation of a state into a modern nation.



2. Rationale/evidence: Positive contributions of the military:

the military is a repository for mechanical skills; the military has geographic mobility, thus serving as an agent of socialization; the military's rational type of organization may contribute to government stability.

Negative contributions of the military: military mentality is not conducive to good civil-military relations; it is easy to exaggerate the efficiency of the military, as it is seldom tested; much of its activity is beyond public observation, which prevents scrutiny; the military always faces the problem of its own legitimacy in politics; military rule often merely adds one more level to an inefficient bureaucracy; to avoid complex problems, the military often becomes pompous and ostentatious.

3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: The existence of a military regime in an underdeveloped country presents unique characteristics, but it does not assure stability or efficiency.
4. Reviewer's comments: The pamphlet is unfortunately too brief to adequately cover so broad a problem.

Annotation 65

Author: Finer, Samuel E.

Title: The Man on Horseback--The Role of the Military in Politics.

Reference: New York: Praeger, 1962.

Summary

An analysis of civil-military relations is made within a framework containing the following hypotheses and variables:

I. Military intervention in politics is influenced by:

A. Motive of the military.

1. Notion of manifest destiny.
2. National interest.
3. Sectional interest.
4. Individual self-interest.

B. Mood of the military.

1. Consciousness of the control of the means of violence.
2. A grievance or grudge.
3. Feeling of self-importance.

C. Opportunity to intervene.

1. Increased civilian dependence on the military.
2. The popularity of the military.

II. Levels of political culture determine the levels and types of military influence.

A. Levels of political culture.

1. Mature.
2. Developed.
3. Low.
4. Minimal.

B. Levels of military intervention in civilian life.

1. Influence.
2. Blackmail.
3. Displacement.
4. Supplantment.

In conclusion, the author says: "We can...think of societies as being at different levels of political cultures. In lands of low political culture, the

need for legitimacy will not prove to be a serious handicap to the military. But in states of advanced culture, it will prove crippling."

Reviewer's Comments

The author's analysis has merit, but he does not give substantial evidence to prove his point. He also represents those who believe that military involvement in politics is generally unfortunate. Other authors have adopted an opposite perspective, arguing that the military may be the only institution which can adequately meet the challenges of a developing nation.

Annotation 66

Author: Gude, Edward W., Davis Bobrow, and Clark Abt.

Title: Arms Control in the Developing Nations.

Reference: Project Unicorn: Raytheon, Space and Information Systems Division. Bedford, Massachusetts, 31 January 1963.

Summary

A serious consideration of problems of arms control in the developing nations must include an analysis of the political and economic roles played by the military.

1. Theme/theory: The emerging nations have expanded their military establishments to deal with the many complex factors which threaten their national survival. The large amount of resources allocated to the military has increased the influence of the Armed Forces in the political and economic life of the state.
2. Rationale/evidence: Political participation of the military:  
"The political position of the military affects the political process at the palace level and then down through the society. With a high threat of internal instability, the military becomes

an important source of power. The necessity to rely on the military for the maintenance of power gives the military significant bargaining power. ... The economic role of the military is not only important because of the drain on limited resources...but as a positive contribution through civic action programs...." The military provides means of social mobility, new value structures, new ideological concepts, and new authority patterns.

3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: "...the role of force is an important element in the operation of the political system in the developing countries. This is a result of lack of consensus on the ends and means of the political process, and the lack of established political tradition."
4. Reviewer's comments: These brief statements on military roles are perceptive and closely related to contemporary problem areas of social science research.

Annotation 67

Author: Janowitz, Morris.

Title: The Military in the Political Development of New Nations.

Reference: Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Summary

In an analysis of the political role, attention must be given to the organizational format, skill structure and career lines, social recruitment, professional and political ideology, and social cohesion of the military. These concepts help in understanding differences in the political behavior of the Armed Forces in the various countries of Asia and Africa. The long-term capacity of the military for political leadership relates to its clear

recognition of its political limitations and its ability to develop civilian-based mass political institutions.

Reviewer's Comments

This short book discusses many of the hypotheses which have delineated the problem area of civil-military relations in new nations. It is invaluable for those who wish to identify areas of further research.

Annotation 68

Author: Kelly, George A.

Title: "The Global Civil-Military Dilemma."

Reference: The Review of Politics, XXV (July 1963), 291-308.

Summary

The nature of civil-military relations is partly determined by the extent of agreement on the meaning of "nation" and the goals of the state between its civilian and military institutions. Military intervention often occurs when the Armed Forces feel that political conditions do not assure national survival. "Armies eventually become vested interests in their society...and there is a widespread occurrence of armies promoting themselves...as modernizing forces in the national structure..." especially in the developing countries.

1. Theme/theory: Any army has a "remarkable capability to grind a fairly common grist from its mill." Military tensions in emergent countries are complicated by the fact that the state is generally a quantity with a shallow reality, and concepts of the historical nation may differ profoundly between civilian and military institutions. "Although any army will have its active corps of politicians, the military as a whole enters politics skeptically."

2. Rationale/evidence: "...training, professional indoctrination, and military organization are roughly the same wherever we look.... In the military milieu, the gorcer's son and the aristocrat's son are apt to develop striking similarity of attitude which they could not acheived in any other earthly context except religious orders." The military coup in Egypt in 1952 and the armed forces intervention in Burma in 1958 came about because the army felt that the interests of the nation were not understood by the civilian elite. The military fears destruction of its professional standing, bureaucratization, and the intricacies of returning power to other hands.
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: "The role of the armed forces is becoming increasingly crucial, because the military group is no longer an inarticulate, chivalric, and conservative element. The relation of new armies to evolving institutional forms...leads to novel kinds of tension."
4. Reviewer's comments: The article makes a number of sound points about common areas of civil-military tensions and includes some well-articulated statements concerning unique problem areas of developing nations.

Annotation 69

Author: Millikan, Max, and Donald Blackmer.

Title: "The Traditional Process in Emerging Nations--The Military,"  
The Emerging Nations. Ed. Max Millikan.

Reference: Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1961.

Summary

This essay reviews those aspects of military organization and training which make the Armed Forces of emerging nations a Western institution.

1. Theme/theory: The nature of the contemporary military organization is modern. It is characteristic of the military profession to accept a concept such as nationalism with all its implications for modernization.
2. Rationale/evidence: The training programs, weapons requirements, and weapons and communication systems are far more advanced than social or economic institutions. The military is seldom challenged in its traditionally-assigned role of combat fighting. Neither is the military challenged in the noncombat roles which it has assumed. Therefore, it faces less difficult problems than do other social and political institutions.
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: A dangerous situation develops when the military begins to isolate itself from the rest of society and independently develops the various processes of modernization. Serious tension can develop between the military units trained and organized under the colonial regime and the newly created nationalist groups. "...the military, the one traditional social order likely to survive the process of social change, may be able to play a key role in promoting mobility while maintaining stability, in facilitating change while preventing chaos. Upon the efficiency with which the military sectors can be made to perform this role may hinge the successful outcome of the transition in many societies."
4. Reviewer's comments: These very cautious comments are sobering to those observers who are sometimes overenthusiastic about the possible contribution that the military establishment can make to developing countries.

Author: Pye, Lucien.

Title: Armies in the Process of Political Modernization.

Reference: Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts  
Institute of Technology. July 1959.

Summary

The author presents a framework for studying and analyzing the roles of military establishments in developing countries. He then applies it to a case study of the Burmese Army.

- 1.. Theme/theory: Western scholarship has been peculiarly inattentive to the sociology of armies and has ignored the significant position of the military in the process of social, technological, and political change. "A doctrine is needed for a better understanding of the role of the military in the process of political modernization."
2. Rationale/evidence: The army in developing areas has been a relatively successful establishment whenever "resources have been effectively mobilized for the purpose of achieving new objectives." The military has successfully created an organization which can blend industrial and traditional disciplines and mores. Therefore, the military may be the most effective instrument for stability and mobility in the emerging states. The technological requirements of military forces have made military leaders acutely aware of the economic and technological backwardness of their countries. Armies in developing areas rarely have to test their strength and effectiveness in combat. Therefore, "few concessions are made to practical needs," and they can use their resources to build up an army according to an ideal model.



3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: "...the military in underdeveloped countries can make a major contribution to strengthening essentially administrative functions. In the past the technologically advanced West has dealt with traditional and transitional societies largely through the role of administrators, and if the new countries are to become modern nation states, they will have to have a class of competent administrators.
4. Reviewer's comments: The author presents a comprehensive introduction to various aspects of military roles in developing countries. The article is of value because it defines problem areas which have been dealt with incompletely in the past. The case study on Burma gives the reader specific information with which to understand and judge the author's attitude on this subject. Although one does not have to agree with the author on every point (for example, that the military produces competent administrators), his comments deserve attention and respect.

Annotation 71

Author: von der Mehden, Fred.

Title: "Political Action by the Military in Developing Areas."

Reference: Social Research, XXVIII (Winter 1961), 459-479.

Summary

The unavoidable participation of the military in the political events of developing nations makes it essential that the nature of this involvement be constructive. The skills and knowledge of military personnel can be of great value in solving many of the complex problems facing these states, but proper guidance and restraint are necessary.

1. Theme/Theory: The variety of circumstances in which the emerging nations find themselves has produced diversities and similarities in their respective military establishments. Generally, differences can be perceived between the military in old and new emerging states. Also, the military themselves see their roles in different ways.

2. Rationale/evidence: Similarities of military establishments: The entrance of the military into national affairs is related to postwar tension. The military is not a monolithic force, and only certain elements become politically active. Intercourse with foreign military groups results in a high spirit of nationalism and a recognition of a country's low economic status. A feeling of efficiency and order in comparison with other public institutions is manifested.

Diversities: One must distinguish between direct and indirect military rule. The three types of direct rule are characterized as caretaker, revolutionary, and reform governments. The emerging states which have been independent for a significant period of time lack the strong spirit of democratic idealism, and a bitterness exists toward civilian elites. The military sometimes begins as a patriotic group, but soon becomes merely one more factor in a struggle for power. The emergence of a forceful junior officer group has altered the conservative personality of the traditional military elite.

3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: A new understanding of the role of the military is necessary. Contrary to the traditional U.S. viewpoint, the military can act as a force for stability and reform, but military participation in politics should be regarded as an interim solution to the complex problems facing the emerging nations.

Civilian leadership groups should make use of the military in the modernization process, while being aware of certain tragic elements of the Latin American experience.

4. Reviewer's comments: The author presents a good introduction to the variety of circumstances in which the military establishment can find itself when participating in the political system of an emerging state. In this way he warns that simple statements concerning the role of the military in developing countries in general are very seldom of much merit.

Annotation 72

Author: von der Mehden, Fred

Title: Politics in Developing Nations.

Reference: New York: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

Summary

In examining the major characteristics of new nations, consideration is given to the role of political disunity and instability in relation to leadership groups, environments, and ideologies. In addition to giving some criteria of stability for 50 developing nations, the author classifies parties and types of military influence.

Reviewer's Comments

The author's criteria for identifying types of political systems in new nations are debatable, at least in some cases. For example, he classifies Haiti as a guided democracy.

Annotation 73

Author: Young, Kenneth T.

Title: "New Politics in New States"

Reference: Foreign Affairs, XXIX (April 1961), 494-504.

Summary

The chaotic situation in many of the new states is somewhat stabilized by a younger elite group for whom "integrity and competence count more than kinship, status, or wealth." The young military officer corps is perhaps the most significant of this elite group. It is in the interest of the United States to support this group of professionals.

1. Theme/theory: "The officer corps, where it exists--and this excludes most of Africa--is often specially qualified to help develop and preserve the nation...when it appears headed toward breakdown and chaos."
2. Rationale/evidence: Although the civilian members of the new elite are as able and patriotic as the military, they are unorganized and disoriented. "As a whole, they lack the discipline, responsiveness, esprit de corps and physical resources which the military establishment can often provide."
3. Extrapolations/interpretations/recommendations: "...the conclusion to be drawn from these experiences is not that we should magnify the mission of the military but rather that we should mobilize civilian professionals to do the job instead."
4. Reviewer's comments: The author's analysis lacks supporting data.

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